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THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW UPON NATIONAL
LAW: A POLlCY·ORIENTED PERSPECTIVE·
By MYRES S. McDOUGAL**
Professor McDougal argues that traditional monistic
and analytical approaches to international law have pre-
vented a true appreciation of its essential nature. In Pro-
fessor McDougal's view, international law is a dynamic,
integrated, global process of authoritative decision, operat-
ing at many different community levels and through many
different institutional devices, to resolve conflicts and affect
policies and value processes in aU the component communi-
ties of the world community. As such, he submits, interna-
tional law can be made an effective instrument for broaden-
ing the perspectives and bases of power of national decision
makers, thereby facilitating the wider and more secure
achievement of those fundamental human desires and goals
which transcend national boundaries.
The Fundamental Policy Issue
From a comprehensive global perspective, one may today observe
that of the effective decisions which constitute the world power proc-
ess, some are taken inclusively, in the sense that several or many or
all states participate in the making of such decisions, and others are
taken exclusively, with only a single state or a few states making
relatively unilateral determination of issues.! Examining in more
* The fourth annual presentation of the Charles Hall Dillon Lectures in Law and
Government at the State University of South Dakota on November 14, 1958.
** Sterling Professor of Law, Yale University..
The author is indebted to Mr. Eliezer Ereli, of the second year class of the Yale
Law School, for assistance in the preparation of this article.
1. By "decisions" we refer to choices among alternatives attended by sanctions in
the form of severe deprivations or high indulgences. So defined, decisions· are outcomes
of power processes.
By "inclusive" and "exclusive" we refer to a continuum in degrees of shared
participation in a social process.
When we describe decisions as inclusive or exclusive, we thus refer, cryptically, to
the number of participants who share the making of sanctioned choices. In more
complete description, the words inclusive and exclusive may, however, be used to
describe degrees of sharing in any and all the detailed phases of a power process,
including access to authoritative arenas, control over base values, the management of
strategies, determination of particular outcomes, and the allocation of competence over
particular events in social processes. .
The same words, inclusive and exclusive, may be used, further, to describe degrees
of sharing in social processes other than power, such as with respect to wealth, enlight-
enment, well-being, and so on, and degrees of sharing may be indicated, similarly, with
respect to all phases of such processes, including the number of participants, access to
situations, control of base values, management of strategies, determination of out-
comes, and effects. In stating the goals of a world public order of human dignity,
which postulates a wide sharing of all values, some such description is indispensable,
and we will use the words inclusive and exclusive, trusting to context to make our
reference clear.
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detail, one may observe, further, both that these effective decisions as
a whole are affected by certain perspectives of authority or lawfulness,
projected by various aspiring systems of world public order, which
purport to allocate competence for decision between the general com-
munity of states and particular states, and that these perspectives of
authority about appropriate allocation of competence, because of their
impact upon decision, also importantly affect the whole world social
process, including the production and distribution of values by and
for all peoples.2 What is at stake, in the problem to which we here
address ourselves, may accordingly, be stated most generally as the
common interest of all peoples of the world in achieving an interna-
tional or world public order which maintains an appropriate creative
balance between the inclusive, shared competence of the entire com-
munity of states and the exclusive, non-shared competence of partic-
ular states. Each state of the world, which genuinely projects a public
order of human dignity, has an interest in the establishment and
maintenance of an inclusive competence which will facilitate the
prescription and application of rational, economically designed policies
for such interactions among peoples as are primarily inclusive, that is,
predominantly transnational, in their effects.3 Each state has in fact,
it may be elaborated, a double interest in such inclusive competence:
first, in the maintenance of democratic access to participation in such
competence, thus insuring that peoples in fact primarily affected by
decisions have a voice in determining such effects; and secondly, in
requiring wide assumption of responsibility for such competence, thus
insuring that decisions inclusively taken from community perspectives,
and necessary to the achievement of common policies, will actually
be put into effect by, and when necessary within the territorial boun-
By inclusive "policies" we will refer to the projection of shared demands with
respect to any value. By inclusive or common "interests" we will refer both to such
shared demands and to the pattern of expectations about conditions affecting possible
realization of such demands.
2. The reference to the "general community of states" should not be taken to
imply any particular degree of universality in international law. The traditional words
are employed merely as a convenient way of referring to the larger groupings of states
seeking common values.
The present sad status of universality, however defined, and detailed methods for
appraising the impact upon values of the various contemporary contending systems of
projected world public order are explored in McDougal and Lasswell, The Identification
and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public Order, 53 AM J. INT'L L. 1 (1959).
3. This is of course a minimum goal of a public order of human dignity. Further
goals must include making certain that policies inclusively prescribed actually do incor-
porate the values of human dignity in the specific relations projected between peoples
and individuals. The difficulties inherent in securing such goals in a world arena
exhibiting not a single public order, but a number of contending public orders, approxi-
mating the values of human dignity in many different degrees in their projected
demands, will be noted in conclusion. A totalitarian order has little concern either for
wide participation in the making of decisions or for insuring that inclusive policies
actually do embody the values of human dignity.
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daries of, particular states. Each state has, further, an interest that
there be reserved to every state an exclusive competence to prescribe
and apply policies, without external intervention, with respect to
interactions among peoples which are primarily exclusive, that is
predominantly local, in their effects. Each state has an interest in its
own freedom, and, hence, because of contemporary interdependences,
reciprocally an interest in the freedom of others-an interest in a
deconcentration of power which will promote not only freedom from
arbitrary decision but also freedom for initiative, experiment, diversity,
and the effective adaptation of community policies to all the pecu-
liarities of the most local contexts. The most general interest of all
states and peoples, adhering to the values of human dignity, is ac-
cordingly in a world public order which achieves that balance between
the inclusive competence of the general community of states and the
exclusive competence of particular states which best promotes the
greatest total production, at least cost, of their shared values.4
Traditional Theories
The traditional approach to clarification of the problem so posed
has moved from the common conception of law, both national and
international, as a "body of rules" and, hence, has been largely in
terms of the interrelation or reciprocal impact of allegedly different
bodies of rules.5 Scholarly opinion for several decades has ranged
from the view, at one extreme, that international law is not law at all
but mere rules of international morality, through varying versions of
dualism or pluralism, to a monistic conception, at the other extreme,
that international law dictates the content of nationallaw.6 Brief and
impressionistic illustration of some of the more influential of these
views may serve to suggest the need for a very different mode of
clarification.
The theory which concedes least competence to inclusive decision
is of course that which denies that international law is law at all.
Writing from the very limited perspectives about decision-makers,
processes of authority, and sanctions which have come to characterize
4. A detailed indication of how this policy may be given operational meaning
with respect to a particular problem is offered in McDougal and Burke, Crisis in the
Law of the Sea: Community Perspectives versus National Egoism, 67 YALE L.]. 539
(1958) .
5. For rich illustration of how the many divergent schools converge upon this
central theme, see Starke, Monism and Dualism in the Theory of International Law,
17 BRIT. YB. INT'L L. 66 (1936); Borchard, The Relation between International Law
and Municipal Law, 27 VA. L. REv. 137 (1940).
6. The formalistic character of the latter position is most evident in the argument
by Stevenson, The Relationship of Private International Law to Public International
Law, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 561 (1952), that public international law dictates the content
of the rules of private international law.
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the analytical school of jurisprudence, John Austin achieved a well-
known conclusion:
"The so called law of nations consists of opinions or sen-
timents current among nations generally. It therefore is not
law properly so called, but rather 'positive moral rules which
are laws improperly so called'.ll7
Most recently, Professor Edwin Patterson, author of a distinguished
American text in lineage from Austin, has made inquiry for the "legal
status" of international law and found none. Taking Hyde's definition
that international law consists of "the principles and rules of conduct
declaratory thereof which nations feel themselves bound to observe,
and therefore commonly do observe, in their relations with each
other," he summarizes:
"International law, then, consists of norms of which the
subjects (persons obligated) are states, and of which the ob-
jects (things regulated) are relations between states."s
The big difficulty in regarding international law as law, despite the
generality of its norms and its purported prescription of official con-
duct, is however, Professor Patterson finds, the absence of appropriate
sanctions. The one sanction which he considers, "war," he appraises
not as appropriate sanction, but rather as the breakdown of law. This
same Austinian conception may be seen to infuse most of the utter-
ances of the contemporary neorealist writers about international rela-
tions who emphasize heavily the role of naked force and minimize the
role of authority in the interactions of states.9
The dualist or pluralist theories, still perhaps the most popular of
all theories, while not explicitly denying that international law is law
and commonly conceding a wide scope to inclusive decision, exhibit
as their most distinctive characteristic, an attempt to rigidify the
fluid processes of world power interactions into two absolutely distinct
and separate systems or public orders, the one of international law
and the other of national law. Each system is, thUS, alleged to have
its own distinguishable subjects, distinguishable structures and proc-
esses of authority, and distinguishable substantive content. The sub-
jects of international law are said to be states only (with occasional
reluctant, contingent admission of international governmental organ-
izations), while those of national law embrace individuals and the
whole host of private associations. The sources of international law
7. 1 AUSTIN, JURISPRUDENCE 184 (5th ed. 1885).
8. PATTERSON, JURISPRUDENCE 174 (1953). The definition from Hyde appears in
1 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (2d ed. 1945).
9. KENNAN, AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 1900-1950 95 (1951).
HeinOnline -- 4 S.D. L. Rev. 29 1959
1959] IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON NATIONAL LAW 29
are found only in the customary behavior of states and in agreements
between them, while the sources of national law are located in the
state's structure of centralized and specialized institutions. The sub-
stantive content of international law is said. to be rules regulating
relations between states, while that of national law is that of rules
regulating the interrelations of individuals and private associations.
Concise expression of this point of view is offered by the late, most
authoritative Professor Lassa Oppenheim:
"Neither can International Law per se create or in-
validate Municipal Law, nor can Municipal Law per se create
or invalidate International Law. International Law and
Municipal Law are in fact two totally and essentially dif-
ferent bodies of law which have nothing in common except
that they are both branches-but separate branches--of the
tree of law. Of course, it is possible for the Municipal Law
of an individual State by custom or by statute to adopt rules
of International Law as part of the law of the land, and
then the respective rules of International Law become ipso
facto rules of Municipal Law. lIlo
With its allegedly clear distinction between international law and
national law achieved, the next task of any particular dualist or
pluralist theory is of course to' reestablish some link or connection
between the systems, in order both to account for the past effectiveness
of international .law and to insure some measure of future effective-
ness. The books abound with elaborate theories of "coordination,"
"auto-limitation," "subordination," "adoption," "incorporation,"
"transformation," and so on, and in derivational exercises designed to
demonstrate some mysterious "basis of obligation" in "natural law" or
in the "common will" or "common consent" of states.ll None of these
exercises has been widely persuasive and there is a certain accuracy
in the observation of one commentator that "the whole dualistic posi-
tion" in measure denies "the juridical nature of international law by
treating it as a kind of morality governing the relations between states
and grounded only in their consent.1Il2
The monist theories, in sharp contrast with the dualist or plural-
ist, find in the world arena a unitary legal system or public order, with
international and national law having comparable, equivalent or
identical subjects, sources, and substantive contents. Though differing
10. Introduction to PICCIOTTO, RELATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW TO THE LAW OF
ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES 10 (1915).
11. BRIGGS, THE LAW OF NATIONS (2d ed. 1952) offers, at page 60 et seq., exten-
sive bibliographical reference to expressions of these multiple theories.
12. STARKE, Monism and Dualism in the Theory of International Law, 17 BRIT.
YB. INT'L L. 68, 73 (1936).
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as to their reasons, whether "legal" or "scientific" or "political,"
monists commonly maintain the primacy or supremacy of interna-
tional law in relation to national, and thus accord a very wide scope
to inclusive decision. The distinguishing feature in the syntax of a
monistic system is that it begins with a verbalization chosen as the
"basic norm" (Grundnorm), such as pacta sunt servanda or the prop-
osition that states ought to continue to behave in the way that they
have customarily behaved, and by derivation from this basic norm
establishes something called the "validity" of all lesser norms in a
pyramid-like series of levels or stratas or hierarchies from top abstrac-
tion to lowest abstraction. The clearest, brief exposition of this theory,
stating the supremacy of international law, is perhaps that of Pro-
fessor Kunz:
"The primacy of the Law of Nations means that the
supraordination of the international juridical order to the
municipal juridical orders of the single States, means that the
'sovereign States' are delegated partial juridical orders of
the international juridical order, means that the pyramid of
the law does not end with the basic norm of the juridical
order of a given single state, but that at the top of the pyra-
mid of law stands the international juridical order....1ll3
"The peers in England are 'equal' because they were all
in the same way subordinated to the King; all men are equal
before God or before the law, because they are all subor-
dinated in the same way to God or to the law; all States are
'equal,' because they are all subordinated in the same way to
international law.1ll4
"[A]ll the activity of the single States is regulated by
the supraordinated law of Nations. The so-called 'domestic
affairs' of the single States are not the affairs which are not
regulated by international law, but the affairs which a State,
under international law, has the exclusive competence to reg-
ulate as it pleases.1ll5
Similar statements, with varying derivational elaborations, could be
offered from many contemporary authors.
Inadequacy of Traditional Theories
It has perhaps already been sufficiently suggested that all these
various theories reflect not so much accurate description of the realities
of the world power process as the varying preferences of their formu-
13. KUNZ, The "Vienna School" and International Law, 11 N.Y.U.L.Q. REV. 370,
402 (1934).
14. Id. at 401.
15. Id. at 399.
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lators about the relative roles of national and international policies.
Underlying the differing formal definitions and syntactical derivations
are differing perspectives about the institutions and values operative
in the world arena and, especially, about the role of law in the more
comprehensive social processes. The point has been most emphatically
made by the master monist, Professor Kelsen:
"The choice between the primacy of international law
and the primacy of national law is, in the last analysis, the
choice between two basic norms. . . . It may be that our
choice, though not determined by the science of law, is guided
by ethical or political preferences. A person whose political
attitude is that of nationalism and imperialism may be in-
clined to accept as a hypothesis the basic norm of his own
national law. A person whose sympathy is for international-
ism and pacifism may be inclined to accept as a hypothesis
the basic norm of international law and thus proceed from
the primacy of international law. From the point of view of
the science of law, it is irrelevant which hypothesis one
chooses. But from the point of view of politics, the choice
may be important since it is tied up with the ideology of
sovereignty.lIl6
The question we raise about all the traditional theories cuts much
deeper, however, than a simple suggestion that the theories are but
reflections of preferences for nationalism or internationalism. The
point we would emphasize is that all the theories, by their focus upon
normative-ambiguous rules and putative interrelations of such rules,
rather than upon processes of authoritative decision in different com-
munity contexts and the interrelations of such processes, fail to offer
an adequate framework of inquiry even for accurate description of
the complex patterns of authority and control, including patterns of
inclusive and exclusive decision, which in fact prevail in the world
arena, much less for scientific investigation of the factors which
account for such patterns or for determining the consequences of
differing patterns upon shared values. It is possible that an organiza-
tion of inquiry which focusses not upon rules and hierarchies of rules,
but rather upon social and power processes of differing territorial
compass, and the interpenetration of such processes by patterns in
control and authority of many different types and intensities, might
facilitate the more effective performance of relevant intellectual tasks,
such as: the description of past patterns, accounting for the factors
affecting patterns, projecting future patterns, appraising patterns in
terms of shared values, and the invention and evaluation of alter-
16. KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 446-47 (1952).
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natives in principles and proceduresY It is this possibility that we
now propose to examine.
Warld Social Process
The most obvious fact in a world arena exhibiting artificial sat~
ellites, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and nuclear warheads is
clearly that of interaction on a global scale, in the sense of effects
transcending all state or other man-made lines. Peoples on opposite
sides of the globe who never confront each other nevertheless con-
tinuously affect each other in a process of inter-determination with
respect to all values which for rough descriptive purposes may be
termed a world social process.IS The actors in this process are in-
dividual human beings; but individuals affiliate with many different
groups and act through the form of, or play roles in, organizations of
the greatest variety, including not only the nation-state but also inter-
national governmental organizations, political parties, pressure groups,
and private associations of all kinds. The values sought by the in-
dividual and his groups in these interactions embrace the whole range
of human preference and may be conveniently categorized in such
terms as power, wealth, enlightenment, respect, well-being, skill, recti-
tude, affection, and so on. The accumulated values which the individ-
ual and his groups employ as bases of power to influence outcomes in
particular interactions cover an equally broad range and may be simi-
larly categorized. The practices engaged in by actors to effect out-
comes range through a spectrum of modalities from maximum
persuasion, at one extreme, to maximum coercion, at the other,' and
include all the varying instruments of policy commonly described as
diplomatic, ideological, economic and military. The effects upon the
distribution of values in fact achieved by actors in any particular inter-
action vary of course enormously in the range of their inclusivity or
exclusivity and in the degree of intensity of their impact upon particu-
lar values. Effects may be confined to a small group of individuals or a
locality or a small territorial community or may extend to a whole state
or group of states or to a continent, a hemisphere, or the globe. In-
tensities may vary from the searing flash of a nuclear explosion to the
murmur of prayer at evening in the solitary chapel. In the contem-
17. The intellectual tasks regarded as indispensable to policy oriented inquiry
about law are indicated in Lasswell & McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy:
Professional Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203 (1943).
The conception of international law and national law as interpenetrating power
processes is amplified in McDougal, The Comparative Study of Law for Policy Pur-
poses: Value Clarification as an Instrument of Democratic World Order, 61 YALE L.J.
915 (1952).
18. Preliminary orientation in the world social process may be found in LASSWELL,
THE WORLD REVOLUTION OF OUR TIME (1951).
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porary world social process with its ever accelerating rate of tech-
nological change, and in which the notion of interdependence is already
a commonplace, it can confidently be expected, moreover, that both
the range and intensity of interactions with inclusive effects will ex-
pand at a similar, ever accelerating, rate.
World Power Process
Only slightly less obvious than contemporary interaction on a
global scale, is the further fact that, as a part of the world social
process, effective decisions are in fact made and implemented which
are as inclusive in their effects as the embracing interactions. Indi-
viduals located on opposite sides of the globe, even in the absence of
direct confrontation, may, once again, by threat or imposition of se-
vere deprivations or by offering high indulgences, make and enforce
choices, which affect the distribution of values among themselves
and others in interactions which for rough description may be called
a world power process.19 Significant participants in this effective
power process include not only the individual, acting as a total per-
sonality in all his roles, but also all his groups and associations, such
as nation-states, international governmental organizations, political
parties, pressure groups, and private associations primarily devoted to
the securing of values other than power. Decisions are taken in
arenas, or situations, which may be described as internal or external
to particular participants and as civic or military, depending upon
expectations about the relative importance of coercion or violence and
peaceful procedures in determining outcomes. In any particular in-
stance, participants may employ any or all values as bases of power for
projecting policy; the sum of the bases of power so utilized through
time may be conveniently categorized in terms of control over people,
resources, and institutions. The practices, the strategies and tactics,
by which participants engage each other range, again, between the
polar extremes of agreement and comprehensive violence. The instru-
ments of policy wielded in reciprocal and continuous process of defense
and attack encompass all the diplomatic, ideological, economic, and
military techniques, each involving its own distinctive means and ef-
fects, and such techniques are commonly combined and coordinated to
achieve the greatest possible impact in projecting policy. The effects
of interactions embrace all the varying degrees of effective control
achieved by a participant, in relation to other participants, over par-
19. Expansion of this theme appears in McDougal, International Law, Power and
Policy: A Contemporary Conception, 82 HAGUE RECUEIL, 137 (1953). See also,
SCHWARZENBERGER, POWER POLITICS (2d en 1951); MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG
NATIONS (2d ed. 1954).
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ticular value changes.2o In a world of ever accelerating interdepend-
ence in all value processes, it may also reasonably be expected that
decisions with inclusive effects will similarly accelerate in range, fre-
quency, and intensity of impact.
The Role of Authority: The Process of Authoritative Decision
The precise role which expectations about authority, commonly
called "law," play in the effective power process of the world is, un-
fortunately, not so easily discernible as are the facts of interaction
and of decision with inclusive effects. More detailed observation of
the processes of effective decision may, however, suggest that perspec-
tives of authority have a much more influential impact upon decision
than is sometimes imagined: confronted with deprivation or threats
of deprivation of values, participants in the world social process com-
monly appeal to authority transcending the state to restrain depriva-
tion or restore values; the expectations of people around the globe
do establish certain decision-makers who commonly respond to appeals
and almost invariably seek to make reasoned decisions and to justify
and explain their decisions by reference to common policy and shared
interests; and the continuous process of power balancing in the world
arena, with all its myriad potentialities in reciprocity and retaliation,
in most instances affords sufficient sanction to secure a measurable
conformity to decision. It does not seem too much, therefore, to gen-
eralize that the world process of effective power exhibits as one
of its integral elements a highly specialized process of authoritative
decision.21
The decision-makers established by common expectation as
authorized to make community decisions from inclusive perspectives
are located primarily in government, national and international, but
it may bear emphasis that such decision-makers function at all levels
and in numerous institutional contexts within both the nation-state
and international governmental organizations. The situations or arenas
in which authoritative decisions are taken include both those in which
states interact with each other, as composite bodies politic, and insist
upon a common responsibility to and for inclusive policies and those
within the internal structures of states in which various national of-
ficials apply inclusively prescribed policies to the greatest variety of
participants. The first type of arena, though it occurs in unorganized
interactions at many different points of contact between officials of
differing states as well as at all levels in the structures of international
20. This analysis of power processes is developed in LASSWELL & KAPLAN, POWER
AND SOCIETY (1950).
21. Documentation may be found in the cases recorded in any of the traditional
treatises upon international law. See HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d Rev. ed. 1945).
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government, we label "external." The second type, occurring only
within the governmental structures of a single state, we label "in-
ternal." The bases of power at the disposal of authorized decision-
makers to secure conformity to decision include the bases of all
participants in the world arena who estimate that they can best maxi-
mize their own particular values by supporting common policies. The
particular authoritative functions performed by decision-makers em-
brace not only the prescription and application of inclusive policies,
but also the performance of an intelligence function for the guidance
of rational decision; the informal recommendation of policies for
formal prescription; the invocation of the application of community
policy and power; and the appraisal and termination of policies.22 In
the performance of some of these latter functions, participants other
than national or international officials, such as individuals, private
associations, pressure groups, and political parties may, of course,
play important roles. The aggregate effects of this specialized process
of authoritative decision may be generalized as the formation and
application of inclusive community policy for allocation of compe-
tence between the general community and particular states, with all
the attendant detailed consequences in terms of relative control over
particular values.23
The Problem Restated
From these broad outlines of world social and power processes,
including that of authoritative decision-making, it may now be pos-
sible to project a more usable conception of international law. For
purposes of policy-oriented inquiry, the most appropriate conception
requires emphasis not upon rules alone or operations alone, but upon
rules and operations,and, further, not upon authority alone or control
alone, but upon authority and control. Rules taken alone cannot be
made to serve adequately either to describe decisions, or to account
for decisions, or to predict decisions, or to appraise the consequences
of decision, much less to perform all these tasks at once. Focus upon
operations only-when among the most important variables affecting
decision are the perspectives of participants, including their demands
for values, their identifications, and their expectations about past and
22. This categorization of policy functions is outlined in LASSWELL, THE DECISION
PROCESS: SEVEN CATEGORIES OF FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS (Bureau of Governmental Re-
search, University of Maryland 1956).
23. As has been suggested above we do not postulate any given degree of univer-
salism in these processes. In a world arena exhibiting a number of contending systems
of public order, each demanding completion on a global scale, the existence of rival
"inclusive" processes and policies cannot be ignored. The proponent of a public order
of human dignity can only seek, as we will suggest in conclusion, to promote the triumph
of structures and functions of authority which best serve his fundamental goal values.
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future events-is equally sterile. In comparable token, authority
alone, when effective power is not at its disposal and expectations of
decision in accordance with community prescription lack realism, is
not law but sheer illusion. Effective control, on the other hand, when
it asserts decision, in the sense of imposition or threat of severe dep-
rivation, without regard for community expectations about how and
what decision should be taken, is not law but naked power or uni-
lateral coercion. The recommendation we make, from perspectives of
human dignity and for efficiency of inquiry into varying patterns of
authority and control, is, accordingly, that international law be re-
garded, not as. mere rules, but as a whole process of authoritative
decision in the world arena, a process in which authority and control
are appropriately conjoined and which includes, along with an in-
herited body of flexible prescriptions explicity related to community
policies, both a structure of established decision-makers and a whole
arsenal of methods and techniques by which policy is projected and
implemented.24
It is scarcely necessary, in order to complete the re-statement in
policy-oriented terms of our general problem of the ~mpact of inter-
national law upon national law, to offer a similarly extensive analysis
of the social and power processes within any single state. Exactly
comparable analysis could be offered of national social and power
processes in terms of participants (government officials, parties, pres-
sure groups, private associations, and individuals), situations of inter-
action (institutional structures, such as government), base values
(control over people, resources, institutional arrangements), strategies
and practices (varying instruments of policy and authority functions),
and outcomes (effects upon values); 25 and an exactly comparable
recommendation could be made, with at least no less persuasion, that
national law, like international law, may be most usefully regarded,
not as a mere body of rules, but as the whole of a specialized process
of authoritative decision. The one point which perhaps requires ex-
plicit note is that the processes of authority within any single state do
project to the attention of officials of other states certain officials with
apparent competence, in terms of national authority, to perform mul-
tiple functions in the world arena. Such functions include not only
engaging in all the modalities of the ordinary processes of persuasion
and coercion between states and making claims against other states
24. The argument for this conception is made at some length in McDOUGAL, The
Policy Science Approach to Internation<U Legal Studies, UNIVERSITY o~ MICHIGAN LAW
SCHOOL, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE UNITED NATIONS 43 (1955).
25. For details, see McDougal, The Comparative Study oj Law jor Policy Pur-
poses: Value Clarification as an Instrument oj Democratic World Order, 61 YALE L.].
915 (1952).
HeinOnline -- 4 S.D. L. Rev. 37 1959
1959] IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON NATIONAL LAW 37
before authorized decision-makers for the application of inclusive
policies and for redress of alleged wrongs, but also, in what Professor
Scelle has felicitously called le dedoublement jotu:tionnel, representing
their state as authoritative decision-makers of the general community
in prescribing and applying inclusive policies for all states.26
From the perspective of our recommended conception of law,
both international and national, as a process of authoritative decision,
the problem of the impact of international law upon national law may
now be given a much sharper focus. The problem is not, as the
Austinians think, one of determining a relationship between mere rules
of international morality and exclusive sovereign command, or, as the
dualists think, of achieving some kind of a logical explanation of how
absolutely sovereign states can be subordinated to, or coordinated by,
"binding" international rules, or, as the monists think, of demon-
strating the common "validity" of a hierarchy of rules by syntactical
derivations from the top of a rule pyramid downwards or from the
bottom upwards. The problem is rather one of the reciprocal impact
or interaction, in the world of operations as well as of words, of inter-
penetrating processes of international and national authority and con-
trol. The relevant hierarchies, if hierarchies are relevant, are not of
rules but of entire social and power processes. The world power
process as a whole may indeed perhaps be insightfully viewed as a
complex hierarchy of power processes of varying degrees of compre-
hension (global, hemispheric, regional, national, local), with the more
comprehensive affecting "inward" or "downward" the less compre-
hensive, and the latter in turn affecting "outward" or "upward" the
former. The metaphor of "nesting" tables or cups might be apt if
such tables and cups could be conceived as being in process of constant
interaction and change. On the level of formal authority, there is in
the power processes a thorough, continuing interpenetration of deci-
sion-makers, structures of interaction, and demanded policies, with
the officials of international authority, for example, often acting in
the arenas of national authority, and vice versa. On the level of
effective power, of the factors which actually shape authoritative de-
cision, it is a commonplace that individuals, private associations,
parties and pressure groups bring their base values to bear upon all
levels of authority, and with little respect for state boundaries. The
important questions are: how, and with what access to decision by
interested participants, are inclusive policies, purporting to express a
common interest, actually prescribed in the world arena for regulating
the practices of states; what balance between the inclusive com-
26. SCELLE, Le PMnomene Juridique du Dedoublement Fonctionnel, RECHTSFRAGEN
DER INTERNATIONALEN ORGANISATION: FESTSCHRIFT FUR HANS WEHBERG, 324 (1956).
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petence of the general community of states and the exclusive com-
petence of particular states, in terms of control over interactions
assigned to each, is in fact established by such prescription; in what
degree, and by what practices, are inclusively prescribed policies ef-
fectively applied in action, in external and internal arenas, to regulate
states both in their external strategies and in their internal policies;
and, finally, how compatible are the aggregate effects achieved, by the
impact of international upon national processes of authority, with
shared values of human dignity?27
Inquiry pursuant to these questions could of course be organized
in many different ways, with initial focus upon any of the most sig-
nificant elements in either of the two relevant interpenetrating proc-
esses of authority. The most convenient mode of organization would
appear, however, to be one which takes off from the differences in-
dicated above between "external" and "internal" arenas. Participants,
claims, decision~makers, and procedures commonly differ with these
differing arenas and external arenas serve in a meaningful sense as
higher "courts" to which appeal may be taken from decisions in
internal arenas regarded as incompatible with inclusive policies.
In external arenas, as we have defined them, the claimants are
most commonly states interacting with each other as composite bodies
politic; the claims are for the prescription or application of inclusive
policy reflecting common interest; the decision-makers include both
the officials of the contending states and other states and international
officials; and the procedures embrace the manifold informal and
formal modalities made available by both international and national
structures of authority.
In internal arenas, as we have defined them, the claimants may
include officials of the state of the forum or of other states but they
commonly include also individuals and private associations, as well as
occasionally political parties and pressure groups; the claims are for
the application either of inclusively prescribed policies or of opposing
exclusive national policies to the interrelations of the claimants,
whether within the territorial domain of the state of the forum or
elsewhere; the decision-makers are those established by the internal
structures of authority of a particular state; and the appropriate pro-
27. Confusion may be caused by the fact that it is inclusive policies, as reflected
in the broad constitutional outlines of world public order, which seek to establish and
delimit both inclusive and exclusive competence. Another sequence in asking the
questions with which we are concerned may add to clarity: How does world public
order establish and delimit inclusive and exclusive competence? How in detail is inclu-
sive competence exercised in the prescription and application of policies in arenas
external to particular states? How in detail is exclusive competence exercised by par-
ticular states in the application of inclusive policies and in the prescription and appli-
cation of exclusive policies in their internal arenas?
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cedures are similarly those established by the internal structures of
that state. Claimants who regard decisions taken in these latter, in-
ternal arenas as unlawful because of conflict with inclusive policies,
may, as indicated, by community expectation and practice secure their
states to appeal for them to the external arenas of "last resort."
For indicating certain broad outlines in answer to the questions
we have posed, we begin with external arenas and will proceed to
internal arenas, offering finally a modicum of appraisal and recom-
mendation.
I.
THE PRESCRIPTION AND ApPLICATION OF INCLUSIVE POLICIES
IN EXTERNAL ARENAS
Despite suggestions still sometimes ventured that the only inter-
national law is that law which a particular state may make effective
within its own boundaries, it is not difficult to observe that inclusive
policies, relating to all values and of the greatest importance for both
common and particular interests, are today being continuously pre-
scribed and applied in external arenas for the effective regulation of
both the external strategies and internal policies of states.
The decision-makers external to a particular state who participate
in the process by which inclusive policies are prescribed and applied
to that state, include of course not only officials of international gov-
ernmental organizations (considered comprehensively to embrace in-
ternational courts, specially constituted arbitral tribunals, and various
specialized agencies), but also the officials of all other states partic-
ipant in the general community. Comprehensive reference would em-
brace as well as multitudinous individuals and private associations
and other groups, operating across state lines, who both engage di-
rectly in some of the authority functions (such as intelligence, recom-
mending, and invoking) and also bring varying amounts of effective
pressure to bear upon authoritative decision-makers in the perform-
ance of all functions. It is sometimes suggested that because state
officials, who on some occasions are claimants being subjected to au-
thority, are on other occasions decision-makers authorized by the
general community to participate in the prescription and application
of inclusive policies, there are no "objective" decision-makers in ex-
ternal arenas. This suggestion would appear to ignore, however, both
that the very fact that state officials must be alternately claimants
and decision-makers requires a promise of reciprocity and clarification
of common interest in all claims and decisions and that the officials of
other states, as well as international officials, are always arrayed
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en bane to reject idiosyncratic interpretations by particular states. It
may perhaps be worth adding that, because of the emergence of many
new states, the establishment of many new international governmental
organizations, and the accelerating multiplication of private associa-
tions and, groups of all kinds, participation in decision-making in ex-
ternal arenas exhibits a very definite trend toward greater democracy.
Authority Functions in External Arenas
The detailed practices or modalities by which decision-makers
external to a particular state participate in the complex processes of
bringing inclusive policies to bear upon that state, may perhaps be
most conveniently described, as prior casual references have antici-
pated, in terms of certain specific authority functions, common to most
governmental processes, under such labels as intelligence, recommend-
Ing, prescribing, invoking, applying, appraising and terminating. By
an intelligence function we refer to the practices in obtaining, proc-
essing, and disseminating information (about trends, conditions, pol-
icies, and estimates of future conduct) by which decision-makers
prepare themselves for decision. Recommendation includes the pro-
motion and advocacy of specific policy alternatives. Prescription refers
to the projection or enactment of policy as authoritative community
rule or expectation. Invocation means the provisional characterization
of conduct according to the requirements of prescriptions, including
demand for application in concrete instances. Application is the ad-
ministering of prescriptions, the final characterization of conduct in
terms of conformity with prescriptions, in concrete instances. Ap-
praisal is the assessment of the success or failure of policy. Termina-
tion is the ending of prescriptions and of arrangements established
under their authority.28
Even the most impressionistic reference to each of these functions
may serve to suggest the very great variety in role and structure by
which today all functions are performed in external arenas:
The intelligence function is performed not only by state
officials, in the traditional modes of diplomats and spies, and
officials of international governmental organizations, with
vast staffs and resources dedicated to the purpose, but also by
wandering individuals, political parties, the private associa-
tions of business and religion, educators, scientists, operators
of mass media of communication, and so on. The nuances in
technique and structural interaction almost defy suggestion.
The recommending function-so easily does intelligence
move into promotion and advocacy-is performed by equally
28. LASSWELL, op. cit. supra note 22, offers more detail.
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variegated officials, individuals and groups. This is indeed
perhaps the principal function of the burgeoning host of new
intergovernmental organizations and specialized agencies.
The function of formally prescribing policy as authori-
tative community expectation is, however, reserved to the
officials of states and of international governmental organiza-
tions and agencies. State officials act by the traditional modes
of agreement and "custom," the latter ambiguous word re-
ferring to the establishment of community expectations by
derivations from past uniformities in conduct alleged to have
occurred with perspectives of authority. The only interna-
tional organizations commonly conceded explicit competence
to create prescriptions remain international courts and ar-
bitral bodies, but as the number of organizations and their
intelligence and recommending activities increase, the thin
line between recommendation, sustained by effective power,
and prescription becomes continually thinner.
The invocation function in one arena or another is open
to all participants. Only states and international govern-
mental organizations may have access to the International
Court of Justice, but individuals and private associations
have access to specially constituted tribunals. Pressure
groups are on occasion explicitly granted access to the struc-
tures of international governmental organizations.
The function of final application of community prescrip-
tion in concrete instances of controversy is, again, one re-
served to the officials of states and international govern-
mental organizations. State officials act not only within the
institutional structures of their own states, as will be de-
scribed in detail below, but also in countless day-to-day and
minute-to-minute interactions from foreign office to foreign
office, and otherwise, with the officials of other states. His-
torically, international courts and specially constituted tri-
bunals have been most obvious among the appliers of
community policy, but constituent elements of the United
Nations, such as the Security Council and the General
Assembly, have begun to play at least as conspicuous a role.
The task of appraising the consequences of policy is of
course a continuous activity of all participants. Occasionally,
however, either specialized commissions or agencies or spe-
cialized structures within states on international govern-
mental organizations are explicitly created for the more
economic performance of this function.
The terminating function, especially important in ex-
ternal arenas because of the absence of fully competent
legislative institutions is, finally, performed, both informally
and formally, by various decision-makers. State officials act
41
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in this task, as in prescription, by both agreement and uni-
lateral application of "customary" expectations, but guiding
policies are different. International governmental organiza-
tions, and especially the United Nations, fortunately play
an ever-increasing role in aiding transition from old policies
to new.29
Interactions of States Regulated in External Arenas
The range of interactions between states with respect to which
inclusively prescribed policies are projected by the process of decision,
outlined above, for regulation of the external strategies and internal
policies of particular states is enormous, extending practically to every
aspect of the international and various national power processes which,
taken together, constitute the world power process. The exact balance
achieved with respect to any particular aspect of interaction or con-
troversial problem between the inclusive competence of the general
community and the exclusive competence of particular states is, of
course, a function of many interdependent variables and differs from
time to time and context to context. The varying allocations achieved
with respect to all problems are commonly described in authoritative
literature under the technical, dichotomous labels of "international
concern" and "domestic jurisdiction" (a new-found equivalent of
"sovereignty" and "independence"), the former label referring to
matters conceded to inclusive community competence, and the latter
to matters relegated to particular states for decision, apart from their
explicit agreement to the contrary, according to their own conceptions
of their peculiar national interests. In a decentralized world arena
some such dichotomy, as the late Lawrence Preuss so effectively dem-
onstrated, appears inescapable.30 When authority is effectively dis-
tributed between a central community and various component com-
munities, appropriate technical words are required to describe the
distribution. It should be clear, however, that words at the level of
abstraction of "international concern" and "domestic jurisdiction" are
more labels for describing the consequences of decision than explan-
atory factors accounting for decision, and that such words do not
refer to "irreducible spheres of rights" or to "impenetrable barriers"
precluding a moving and variable line between inclusive and exclusive
competence.3! Like the Tenth Amendment in the United States Con-
29. The summary statements we offer of how the various policy functions are today
performed may be documented by reference to the various systematic treatises upon
international relations and international law. See, for example, the works of Schwarzen-
berger, Morgenthau, and Hyde referred to above.
30. Preuss, Domestic Jurisdiction, 74 HAGUE RECUEIL 555, 556, 568 (1949).
31. [d. at 568. See also McDougal & Leighton, The Rights of Man in the World
Community: Constitutional Illusions versus Rational Action, 59 YALE L.J. 60, 77 (1949).
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stitution, the technical concept "domestic jurisdiction" merely states
that matters which are not conceded to inclusive competence are re-
served for exclusive. Like "delegated powers," the technical concept
"international concern" merely states that matters which are not re-
served to exclusive competence are delegated to inclusive.
For impressionistic indication of the broad range of interactions
between states, control of which is commonly regarded as within in-
clusive competence and for which inclusive policies are prescribed and
applied in consequential degrees, brief reference may be made to
some of the more important policies with respect to each of the prin-
cipal elements or phases in the inter-penetrating power processes:
participants, arenas, bases of power, practices, and effects. It will be
kept in mind as we summarize that an indication of the scope of in-
clusive competence is, by inverse statement, equally an indication of
the residuary exclusive competence. We proceed phase by phase.
First, participants. Inclusive prescriptions even impose limits
upon what territorially organized communities may be regarded as
"states." Limits are imposed in terms of control over people, control
over territory, and stability in governmental structures. Of the some
two hundred territorial communities in the world, only about 90 are
commonly regarded as meeting community requirements for states.32
Dependent bodies politic and the internal subdivisions of states are
severely restricted in their access to authority functions.
Once the general community, furthermore, recognizes a terri-
torially organized community as a "state," it imposes similarly severe
limits upon the extent to which the particular body politic can escape
its international obligations by alleging changes in its legal status as
a "state." The policies of maintaining stability in expectations about
appropriate participants, and the needs of security in undertakings,
are deemed important enough to warrant regulation by inclusive deci-
sion of changes in effective control and formal authority, irrespective
of internal prescriptions.33 Professor Borchard comprehensively sum-
marizes:
"A general government de facto, having completely
taken place of the regularly constituted authorities in the
state, binds the nation. So far as its international obliga-
tions are concerned, it represents the state. It succeeds to
the debts of the regular government it has displaced, and
transmits its own obligations to succeeding titular govern-
ments. Its loans and contracts bind the state, and the state
32. BRIGGS, op. cit. supra note 11, at 65 j see also Briggs, New Dimensions in
International Law, 46 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 677 (1952).
33. The reference is to the traditional doctrines and practices of state and govern-
mental succession. See BRIGGS, op. cit. supra note 11, at 194 et seq.
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is responsible for the governmental acts of the de facto
authorities . . . The legality or constitutional legitimacy of
a de facto government is without importance internationally
so far as the matter of representing the state is con-
cerned . . . ."34
The 1923 Tinoco Arbitration between Costa-Rica and Great Britain35
bears eloquent testimony to the same conclusion. Financial under-
takings by the revolutionary Tinoco government, which held effective
power for some thirty months under a new constitution, were repu-
diated by Costa-Rica on the ground that Tinoco's seizure of power
did not conform to the prior constitution. Rejecting this contention,
Taft, Arbitrator, held that inclusive, rather than exclusive prescrip-
tions determine whether a de facto authority is recognized as a
participant in external arenas. He reasoned:
"To hold that a government which established itself and
maintains a peaceful administration, with the acquiescence
of the people for a substantial period of time, does not be-
come a de facto government unless it conforms to a previous
constitution would be to hold that within the rules of inter-
national law a revolution contrary to the fundamental law
of the existing government, cannot establish a new· govern-
ment. This cannot be, and is not, true."36
Second, access to areoos. Though inclusive policy prescribes
some limits upon states in recognizing other territorial communities
as states, such as with respect to premature recognition of rebel
groups, it still accords states a very large discretion, in primitive way,
to determine whether they will "recognize" newly emerged bodies
politic as equal participants in processes of authority, with reciprocal
access to arenas in their national structures and all attendant benefits.
Fortunately, however, the pressures of effective power processes or-
dinarily in time remedy the lack of legal duty and compel recognition,
and a vast amount of inclusive policy prescribes the consequences, for
many and various interactions, of recognition, failure of recognition, .
and withdrawal of recognition.3T
Problems of membership, representation, and credentials in inter-
national organizations and tribunals are controlled largely by express
agreement and customary international prescription is confined gener-
ally to principles of interpretation.3s The jurisdictional doctrines of
34. BORCHARD, DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD 206-7 (1915).
35. 18 AM. J. INT'L L. 147 (1924).
36. Id. at 154.
37. BRIGGS, op. cit. supra note 11, at 99.
38. 1 SOHN, CASES ON UNITED NATIONS LAW (2d ed. 1956).
HeinOnline -- 4 S.D. L. Rev. 45 1959
1959] IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON NATIONAL LAW 45
private international law, including the doctrines of acts of states, as
well as treaties of "friendship, commerce, and navigation," impose
upon states a relatively high degree of duty to admit to their authori-
tative arenas both the private associations chartered by other states
and the individual nationals of other states.39
Third, bases of power. We will deal with control over resources,
control over people, and freedom in institutional arrangements.
In recent decades community prohibitions of unauthorized coer-
cion have attempted to secure to state officials a relatively high degree
of continuous control over their territorial base. Other important
prescriptions have long governed the determination and administra-
tion of boundaries, especially sea boundaries. Still other policies, as
old as the Romans, rewarding priority in time, effectiveness of control,
and initiative in the exercise of peaceful activity are honored for
stabilizing claims to new and unappropriated resources. Policies de-
signed to promote the fullest, conserving and productive use are being
continually projected in abundant measure for balancing inclusive and
exclusive claims to sharable and strategic resources, such as the
oceans/o international rivers, international waterways, polar regions,
and air space, and are beginning to be explored for outer-spaceY
Inclusive policies stabilize the claims of state officials to the con-
trol of people, as members of their communities, by the traditional
doctrines of ius soli and ius sanguinis and by certain ancillary prin-
ciples about naturalization and denaturalization, subsequent to birth.
The recent N ottebohm case/2 imposing upon states the requirement
of a "genuine connection" between the individual and the state com-
munity for naturalization to command deference from other states, is
a sufficiently dramatic example of the assertion of general community
power to be worth special mention.
In the N ottebohm case, Liechtenstein claimed compensation from
Guatemala upon the ground that the latter had violated international
law in seizing property, as alleged enemy property, belonging to a
citizen of Liechtenstein who had been domiciled in Guatemala. The
Court refused to give effect to the bestowal by Liechtenstein of its
nationality upon Nottebohm, stating that although "international law
leaves it to each state to lay down rules governing the grant of its
own nationality," still:
39. RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (1945-50).
40. McDougal and Burke, Crisis in the Law of the Sea: Community Perspective
versus National Egoism, 67 YALE L.J. 539 (1958); McDougal & Schlei, The Hydrogen
Bomb Tests in Perspective: Lawful Measures for Security, 64 YALE L.J. 648 (1955).
41. BRIGGS, op. cit. supra note 11, at 239, offers general .citations. See also
McD<>ugal & Lipson, Perspectives for a Law of Outer Space, 52 AM. J. INT'L L. 407
(1958) .
42. [1955] I.C.J. REp. 4.
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"[A] State cannot claim that the rules it has thus laid
down are entitled to recognition by another State unless it
has acted in conformity with this general aim of making the
legal bond of nationality accord with the individual's gen-
uine connection with the State which assumes the defence of
its citizens by means of protection as against another
State."43
The Court explained:
"[N]ationality is a legal bond having as its basis a
social fact of attachment, a genuine connection of existence,
interests and sentiments, together with the existence of re-
ciprocal rights and duties. It may be said to constitute the
juridical expression of the fact that the individual upon whom
it is conferred, either directly by the law or as the result of
an act of the authorities, is in fact more closely connected
with the population of the State conferring nationality than
with that of any other State. Conferred by a State, it en-
titles that State to exercise protection vis-a-vis another State,
if it constitutes a translation into juridical terms of the in-
dividual's connection with the State which has made him its
national."44
Customary international law imposes few limits upon the controls
which state officials may assert over their own nationals, but projects,
in the form of rules about "the rights of aliens" or the "diplomatic
protection of citizens abroad," substantial limitation upon what state
officials may do to the nationals of other states.411 It may be that
developing perspectives of human rights will close this gap and make
available to citizens protection comparable to that established for
aliens.
The freedom of states to arrange and control their own internal
institutions as bases of power has been subjected to little inclusive
regulation.46 The traditional principle has been, in the language of
Thomas Jefferson, that "every (state) may govern itself according to
whatever form it pleases, and change these forms at its own Will."47
The more recent formulation in the United Nations Declaration of
the Rights and Duties of States is closely comparable:
"Every State has the right ... to exercise freely, without
dictation by any other State, all its legal powers, including
the choice of its own form of government."48
43. Id. at 23 (Italics added).
44. Ibid.
45. BRIGGS, op. cit. supra note 11, at 601.
46. SOHN, op. cit. supra note 38, at 575.
47. 1 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 177-78 (1940).
48. Art. 1; Annex to U.N. Gen. Ass. Res. No. 375 (IV), U.N. Gen. Ass. Off. Rec.
4th Sess., Resolutions, p. 67 (1949).
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For limiting this exclusive competence to control internal insti-
tutions, there is, however, a countervailing principle of inclusive policy
that defects in a state's institutional structure may not be pleaded to
avoid performance of international duty. The purport of this prin-
ciple is establishment of a complementary responsibility for devising
and maintaining internal institutional structures adequate for the
implementation of policies inclusively prescribed. Thus, in the Ala-
bama claims, the Arbitral· Tribunal declared, with respect to Great
Britain's failure to enact legislation necessary for carrying out a duty
to prevent hostile use of neutral territory, that "the government of
Her Britannic Majesty cannot justify itself for a failure in due
diligence on the plea of insufficiency of the legal means of action which
it possessed."49 The principle had been carefully formulated in the
contention of the United States:
"It must be borne in mind, when considering the munic-
ipallaws of Great Britain, that, whether effective or deficient,
they are but machinery to enable the Government to perform
international duties which they recognize, or which may be
incumbent upon it from its position in the family of nations.
The obligation of a neutral State to prevent the violation of
the neutrality of its soil is independent of all interior or local
law. The municipal law may and ought to recognize that
obligation; but it can neither create nor destroy it, for it is
an obligation resulting directly from international law, which
forbids the use of neutral territory for hostile purpose."50
Fourth, practices. We will deal with policies which focus about
the two polar extremes of coercion and persuasion.
The knowledge is common today that after long centuries of
development culminating in the recent formulations of the League
of Nations, the Pact of Paris, the United Nations Charter, and the
Nuremberg Charter, Verdict, and Principles, the general community
of states has achieved a distinction between permissible and non-
permissible coercion, with that coercion prohibited which creates in a
target state reasonable expectation that it will be forced to use the
military instrument in defense of its independence and territorial
integrity.51 The prohibited coercion embraces not merely the use of
the military instrument to attack the values of the target state but
the use of any and all instruments of policy, diplomatic, ideological,
49. 7 MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1061 (1906).
50. PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON, GENEVA ARBITRATION 47
(1872) .
51. McDougal & Feliciano, International Coercion and World Public Order: The
General Principles of the Law of War, 67 YALE LJ. 771 (1958); The Initiation of
Coercion: A Multi-Temporal Analysis, 52 AM. J. INT'L L. 241 (1958).
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economic, and military, whether used singly or in combination, if the
coercion which ensues is of the requisite intensity and magnitude.
Permitted coercion is characterized triply as coercion in the ordinary
interactions of states which does not rise to the requisite intensity;
coercion which extends even to the use of military violence if it is
response in self-defense to prohibited coercion by others; and coercion
which is exercised in organized, general community police action.. The
technical distinctions between non-permissible and permissible coer-
cion are taken in terms, on the one hand, of "aggression," "war of ag-
gression," "breach to peace," "threat to the peace," etc., and, on the
other hand, of "lawful interaction," "self-defense," and "police action."
Elaborate community machinery, with a great variety of different
decision-makers of differentiated function, has been established for
the administration of these prescriptions, and it is a hope fervently
shared in many quarters of the globe that such administration may
be more effectively pursued.
It may be noted in addition that constitutional and statutory
provisions internal to a state are no defense to charges of violating
the law of war. The Nuremberg Charter and verdict reject both "acts
of state" and "superior orders" as unqualified defenses.52
Many inclusive policies are designed to make easier the processes
of persuasion and agreement. Perhaps the oldest and most uniformly
observed of all doctrines protect diplomats and afford them facilities
for negotiation. The law of treaties presents a vast body of principles
of high rationality and common effectiveness, with respect to the
formation, application, interpretation, and termination of agreements.53
It is unfortunate, however, that customary international law contains
no agreed requirement, even with the contemporary prohibition of
aggression, that states must actually exchange agents and engage in
peaceful interactions, though effective pressures again ordinarily
achieve what authoritative doctrine does not. Similarly, inclusive
prescriptions about the constitutional structures and competence which
states must maintain for performance of a peaceable, responsible role
in world social and power processes are most primitive in reach and
content. Though the very definition of a state, for authoritative de-
cisions, requires, as we have seen, a certain stability in governmental
structures and a "full capacity to enter into relations with other
states,1l54 no particular procedures or standards for procedures are
52. SOHN, op. cit. supra note 38, at 845.
53. BRIGGS, op. dt. supra note 11, at 836; Parry, Some Recent Developments in
the Making of Multipartite Treaties, 36 'fR. GROTIUS Soc. 147 (1952).
. 54. Art. 1 of the 1933 Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States,
U.S. T.S. No. 881.
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stipulated. The problem becomes of the most urgent importance when
a particular state seeks to avoid performance of an apparently validly
concluded agreement upon the ground that its internal constitutional
requirements were not in fact met. So important is this problem in our
general inquiry that we reserve it for later, more detailed, technical
treatment.
Fifth, and finally, effects upon jurisdiction. For regulation of
the claims asserted by the various states to authoritative control over
particular value changes, both within and beyond their territorial
boundaries, the general community of states prescribes an elaborate
set of flexible and complementary doctrines, designed both to allow
any particular state substantially affected by events to assert its au-
thority over such events and yet to achieve a compromise between
conflicting claims in a public order which will permit the world's
work to get on. One set of prescriptions, sometimes called the "bases"
of jurisdiction-the principle of territoriality, the principle of nation-
ality, the principle of universality, and other principles-authorizes
states, which have secured a degree of effective control over persons
or resources, to exercise their authority, under stipulated conditions
of significant impact upon national values, to make and apply their
law to certain particular events in which such persons or resources
have been involved.55 A second set of prescriptions requires states,
despite the fact that they may have acquired effective control over the
persons and resources involved, to yield that control in deference to
the "acts of state" or "immunities" of other states and to permit such
states to make and apply their law to the events in question.56 Still
other prescriptions seek to individualize and make applicable the pol-
icies embodied in both sets of prescriptions, both those expressing
the primary assertions of authority and those requiring deference to
others, in a way to take into account the special characteristics of the
various spatial domains: land, the oceans, air space, and outer space.57
The function of all these various prescriptions is not arbitrarily to dic-
tate decision but rather to focus the attention of decision-makers upon
all the significant features of a context in controversy and to assist in
assessment of the varying relevance and importance of such features
in determining degree of impact upon national values. The overriding
policy infusing all prescriptions is that of creating a stability in the
expectations of state officials that the aggregate flow of controversies
55. Yntema, The Historic Bases of Private International Law, 2 AY. J. COMPo L.
297 (1953). WOLFF, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1950).
56. Comment, "Act of State" Immunity, 57 YALE L. J. 108 (1947-8); Comment
The Jurisdictional Immunity of Foreign Sovereigns, 63 YALE L.J. 1148 (1953-4). '
57. COOPER, THE RIGHT TO FLY (1947); HIGGINS AND COLOMBOS, INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF THE SEA (3d ed. 1954).
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will be handled in the "agreed" ways and that they may, hence, make
their power, wealth, and other value calculations with minimum dis-
ruption from arbitrary and unrestrained coercion and violence. The
Det effect is, in sum, that a state substantially affected by any partic-
ular event is authorized to make and apply law for that event, upon
condition that it take into account the degree of involvement of the
values of other states in the same or comparable events, and that the
community of states as a whole achieves a measure of subordination
to public order of other participants-individuals, private associa-
tions, pressure groups, and parties-in a relatively ordered exploita-
tion of the world's resources, sharable and non-sharable.
Sanctions in External Arenas
It may perhaps require emphasis that, despite the absence from
the world arena of a centralized executive organ, there are ample
sanctions-if sanctions be defined as implementing techniques or
available base values--at the disposal of the general community of
states, assuming a willingness by states to employ sanctions, for
securing that inclusive prescriptions are honored in actual conduct by
a reasonable conformity. Exactly the same base values (power,
wealth, respect, enlightenment, and so on) and exactly the same in-
struments of policy (diplomatic, ideological, economic, and military)
may be used in support as in attack upon inclusive policy.58 The
history of state interactions reveals a constant flow of examples in
which all these base values and all these instruments of policy have
been employed, in many differing combinations, and in organized and
unorganized modalities, for the enforcement of community prescrip-
tion. The difficulty is that, on occasion, what has been missing is, not
efficient procedures, but rather the appropriate predispositions of de-
cision-makers, the general community consensus, necessary to sustain
the application of sanctions. Decision-makers act, as we have seen,
like other men, to maximize their values as individuals and as mem-
bers of all the groups and associations, including the state, with which
they identify. The important decision-makers of the world arena have,
as indicated above, been able to clarify a long-term common interest
in the enforcement of many inclusive prescriptions-such as with
respect to the allocation of resources, the protection of diplomats, the
making of agreements, the distribution of jurisdiction over particular
events,' and so on-and for sanctioning such prescriptions, have estab-
lished an elaborate network of expectations about reciprocal claim
58. Reports of the Collective Measures Committee, United Nation's General
Assembly, Official Records, Sixth Session, Supplement No. 13 (A/1891) (1951) and
Seventh Session, Supplement No. 17 (A/2215) (1952); WILD, SANCTIONS AND TREATY
ENFORCEMENT (1934).
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and mutual tolerance, promise of reciprocity and threat of retaliation,
which in the main secures a high degree of effective application. For
other prescriptions, such as the community prohibition of unauthorized
violence, common interest has not yet been clarified in comparable
degree, effective elites are not yet fully convinced that in destroying
others they will destroy themselves, and expectations of enforcement
are accordingly low. The task of enhancing the effectiveness of in-
clusive prescriptions in the world arena remains, in measure, a task
of enlightenment.
Limitations Upon the Effectiveness of Inclusive Policies
There are of course, despite the highly optimistic picture we have
sketched above, important continuing limitations upon the effective
capacity of the general community of states to subject dissentient
members to its inclusive policies. Such limitations include, as a reflec-
tion or expression of the absence of centralized legislative, executive,
and judicial organs: the characteristic insistence by states upon their
own unilateral competence, apart from explicit agreement otherwise,
to make their own exclusive interpretations both of customary inter-
national law and of any agreements to which they may have com-
mitted themselves; the reluctance and common refusal of international
officials, judicial and other, to assume competence or jurisdiction with
respect to interactions or controversies in the absence of a clear con-
sent by states party to the interaction or controversy; and the still
prevailing unwillingness of states to submit what they regard as im-
portant national interests in controversies to the determination or
arbitrament of common organs or disinterested third-party decision-
makers. Counterbalancing these very real limitations, there are, how-
ever, fortunately certain other important factors in contemporaneous
community expectations about authority, including such items as:
states other than the participant insisting upon its own unilateral
competence to determine its obligations are not required to accept
such determination as authentic interpretation of customary law or
relevant agreement, but may make their own interpretations; inter-
national officials, when confronted with alleged conflicts between
inclusive international prescription and exclusive national prescrip-
tion, almost invariably give effect to the inclusive prescription; and an
increasingly prevalent view seeks to clarify an authoritative com-
munity expectation that states may not impose any defects or in-
adequacies in their own constitutions or national laws against others
as defenses to obligation under either customary international law or
agreements apparently concluded in proper form. For balanced per-
spective, we may look briefly at both these continuing limitations and
counter-balancing factors.
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Auto-Interpretation
The special prerogative claimed by states to interpret their own
obligation, and in a sense to act as judges of their own cause, has long
been regarded as a conspicuous Achilles heel in international law.
Thus, Professor Leo Gross has felicitously written:
"It is generally recognized that the root of the unsatis-
factory situation in international law and relations is the
absence of an authority generally competent to declare what
the law is at any given time, how it applies to a given situa-
tion or dispute, and what the appropriate sanction may be.
In the absence of such an authority, and failing agreement
between the states at variance on these points, each state
has a right to interpret the law, the right of auto-interpreta-
tion, as it might be called.mm
This does not mean, however, that any single state may authoritatively
impose, despite any effective power simply to refuse to perform, its
own unilateral interpretation upon other states. By the principle of
equality of states, each state has the same license. As Arbitrator
Nelson stated in the case of The David J. Adams, in holding that
neither Canada nor the United States was necessarily bound by an
interpretation rendered by the other:
"The fundamental principle of the juridical equality of
States is opposed to placing one State under the jurisdiction
of another State. It is opposed to the subjection of one State
to an interpretation of a Treaty asserted by another State.
There is no reason why one more than the other should im-
pose such a unilateral interpretation of a contract which is
essentially bilateral."60
The more general principle is, further, quite commonly accepted, in
clear exception to the doctrine of "acts of state," that states are not
required to give effect to foreign laws or decisions which are con-
sidered to be contrary to international law.61 Similarly, a unilateral
determination by state officials of their rights and obligations in a
particular context does not control an international decision-maker,
obtaining jurisdiction, even in the same context. Thus, to German
officials who urged an inherent right of self defense in their state as
justification for invasion of Denmark and Norway, the Nuremberg
Tribunal responded:
59. Gross, States as Organs of International Law and the Problem of Autointer-
pretation, in LAW AND POLITICS IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY 76-7 (Lipsky ed. 1953).
60. 5 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 268 (1943); BRIGGS, op. cit.
supra note 11, at 892.
61. Authorities are collected in BRIGGS, op. cit. supra note 11, at 405.
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"It was further argued that Germany alone could de-
cide, in accordance with the reservations made by many of
the Signatory Powers, at the time of the conclusion of the
Kellogg-Briand Pact, whether a preventive action was a
necessity, and that in making her decision, her judgment was
conclusive. But whether action taken under the claim of self-
defense was in fact aggressive or defensive must ultimately
be subject to investigation and adjudication if international
law is ever to be enforced."62 .
Consent Required for Third Party Competeme
The reluctance of international tribunals and organizations to
assume competence over events in absence of the consent of partici-
pant states derives quite obviously from concern for both effectiveness
and the will of the governed. Classic illustration of this reluctance is
found in the decisions, in both contentious cases and advisory opinions,
of the International Court of Justice and its predecessor. "There are,"
Sir Hersch Lauterpacht has written, "few rules of modern international
law which are more widely acknowledged than the rule that the juris-
diction of international tribunals is derived from the will of the
parties ..."63 Thus, in the famous Eastern Carelia case, when the
Council of League of Nations asked the Permanent Court for its
advisory opinion on the dispute between Finland and Russia about
the status of Eastern Carelia, and Russia notified the Court of its
refusal to take any part in the proceedings, the Court declined to give
its opinion, emphasizing that no state could without its consent be
compelled to submit to any form of specific settlement.64 More re-
cently in the case of Monetary Gold Removed from Rome,65 con-
cerning competing claims to certain gold seized in 1943 by the Ger-
mans and belonging at that time to Albania, when Italy, who had
initiated the proceedings, challenged the Court's jurisdiction prin-
cipally upon the ground that Albania was not a party, the Court
upheld the objection, finding that the opposed claims raised issues
which would require determination of the lawfulness, as between
Italy and Albania, of an Albanian nationalization law. Opinion was
offered that: '
"The ~ourt cannot decide such a dispute without the
consent of Albania. But it is not contended by any Party
that Albania has given her consent in this case either ex-
62. INTERNATIONAL MILITARY T!uBUNAL, TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS
208 (1947). .
63. LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTER-
NATIONAL COURT 338 (1958).
64. P.C.I.]. SER. B., No.5 (1923).
65. [1954] I.C.]. REp. 19.
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pressly or by implication. To adjudicate upon the interna-
tional responsibility of Albania without her consent would
run counter to a well-established principle of international
law embodied in the court's statute, namely, that the Court
can only exercise jurisdiction over a State with its con-
sent."66
Similarly, in another recent case instituted by the United States
against Russia, Treatment in Hungary of Aircraft and Crew of the
United States of America, the Court, upon Russia's stating that it found
unacceptable the United States' proposal to submit the dispute to the
Court, simply ordered the case removed from the list.67 In contrast,
however, in Interpretation of the Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hun-
gary, and Rumania,6s the Court at least wavered in its consistency. In
this case the Court rendered an Advisory Opinion requested by the
United Nations' General Assembly even though the three named coun-
tries had not consented to the Court's jurisdiction. The Court en-
deavored to distinguish Eastern Carelia, but it has been suggested by
a distinguished commentator that the bases offered for distinction are
sufficiently tenuous to cast substantial doubt upon the continuing au-
thority of the principle of consent.69 More significant departure from
the traditional principle of authority based upon consent may perhaps
be noted in the United Nations Charter provision that "The organiza-
tion shall ensure that states which are not members of the United Na-
tions act in accordance with these Principles so far as may be necessary
for the maintenance of international peace and security.mo
Competence Reluctantly Conceded
The reluctance of states by agreement to confer competence
upon international officials or third-party decision-makers, may de-
rive either from rational concern for short-term national interest in
a modestly organized world arena or from less sharable demand for
long-term privileged position. In an effort to preserve the largest
possible domain for unilateral decision, state officials have commonly
insisted upon distinguishing non-justiciable or "political" disputes
and justiciable or "legal" disputes. This alleged distinction received
66. Id. at 32.
67. Id. at 103, 105.
68. [1950] I.C.]. REP. 65.
69. LAUTERPACHT, op. cit. supra note 63, at 354. See also Carlston, Interpretation
oj Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania, 44 AM. ]. INT'L L. 728 (1950).
70. U.N. Charter, Article 2(6). See Morton, International Agreements and Third
States, 15 GA. B. ]. 417 (1953) for review of recent developments.
The significance of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice in
Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, [1949] I.C.].
REP. 174, in recognizing the competence of the United Nations to impose obligations
upon nonmembers is indicated in LAUTERPACHT, op. cit. supra note 63, at 311.
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emphasis in Article 16 of the 1899 Hague Convention for Pacific
Settlement, which made reference, in apparent effort to distinguish
other questions, to "questions of a legal nature," including especially
"the interpretation or application of international conventions," with
respect to which "arbitration was recognized by the signatory Powers
as an effective and equitable means of settling disputes not settled by
diplomacy."71 Some such dichotomy has been enshrined in almost
every treaty of arbitration and adjudication since 1899, and was also
incorporated in Article 36( 2) of both the Statute of the Permanent
Court of International Justice and the Statute of the International
Court of Justice. This attempted distinction, as Judge Lauterpacht
has so persuasively demonstrated, rests upon no identifiable variable
or set of variables in either factual controversies or existing and pos-
sible processes of authoritative decision.72 The distinction lies rather
in the willingness or unwillingness of states to submit to inclusive
decision: disputes that state officials are willing to have decided in-
clusively are characterized "legal" and justiciable; disputes that they
are not willing so to submit are described as "political." Even con-
troversies frequently regarded as justiciable have, further, at times
been barred from the application of community prescription when the
issues were thought to affect such expandable matters as vital interests,
honor and independence. An historic model is found in Article 1 of
the 1903 British-French arbitration treaty which reads:
"Differences which may arise of a legal nature, or
relating to interpretation of treaties existing between the two
Contracting Parties ... shall be referred to the Permanent
Court of Arbitration . . . provided nevertheless, that they
do not affect the vital interests, the independence, or the
honor of the two States, and do not concern the interest of
third Parties.1173
Still other hardly less sweeping restrictions have excepted from
arbitration any dispute which, in the opinion of either party "con-
cerns questions affecting principles of its constitution," or touching
"directly or indirectly" the territorial integrity of the parties.74
This traditional unwillingness of states to accept third-party
71. 2 SCOTT, THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES OF 1899 AND 1907 89 (l916).
72. LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
(1933) Passim.
73. 13 HERTSLET, TREATIES 492 (l869). For a great profusion of other examples
see HABICHT, POST-WAR TREATIES OF PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES
992-93 (l931); Wilson, Reservation Clauses in Agreements for Obligatory Arbitration,
23 AM. J. lNT'L L. 68 (1929).
74. See HABICHT, op. cit. supra note 73, at 994-96. See e.g., the 1928 arbitration
treaty with Sweden, id. at 858.
For further discussion of the general problem, see Waldock, The Plea of Domestic
Jurisdiction before International Tribunals, 31 BRIT. VB. INT'L L. 96 (l954).
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decision is excellently illustrated in the contemporary reservations in
acceptances of the so-called compulsory jurisdiction of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice.75 The British acceptance, for example, con-
ceded jurisdiction only over disputes arising after adherence to the
optional clause and only when arising from facts or situations sub-
sequent to such acceptance.76 This reservation stimulated other com-
parable acceptances and, ironically, a similar declaration by Iran was
important to the Court's finding of lack of jurisdiction in the Anglo-
Iranian Oil Co. case, brought by the United Kingdom against Iran.77
The acceptance made by the United States has been described as
creating obligation in "name only" and as tending to reduce "the
acceptance of the Clause to the vanishing point of legal obligations. ll78
Following the suggestions of Mr. John Foster Dulles, the well-known
Connally reservation withheld from the Court jurisdiction in matters
"essentially within the domestic jurisdiction" of the United States
"as determined by the United States of America.ll79 This reservation
apparently stemmed from apprehension that without it "the Court
might invade such fields as immigration, the tariff and the control of
Panama Canal."80 Other states including France followed the ex-
ample of the United States,81 but the experience of France indicates
that the Connally reservation may not always serve national self-
interest. In the Case oj Certain Norwegian Loans, France asked the
Court to take jurisdiction over a dispute with Norway concerning the
payment of various Norwegian loans issued in France.82 Although
Norway had not attached a domestic jurisdiction-as-decided-by-Nor-
way reservation, it relied upon the French Connally-type reservation
in claiming that unilateral decision of the issue was within the com-
petence of Norway. The Court, observing that its competency was
75. Contemporary unwillingness to accept obligation is indicated in the title of a
recent survey, Waldock, Decline oj the Optional Clause, 32 BRIT. YB. INT'L L. 244
(1955-56) .
Some change in attitude appears in the address of Attorney General William P.
Rogers to the International Law Association on September 2, 1958. Mr. Rogers called
for a re-examination of the "domestic jurisdiction" reservation and urged its limitation
in a way to give more support to the court. New York Times, September 3, 1958.
Certain hopeful developments are recounted in Lawson, The Problem oj the Com-
pulsory Jurisdiction oj the World Court, 45 AM. J. INT'L L. 219 (1952).
76. For text see HABICHT, op. cit. supra note 73, at 88l.
77. [1952] I.C.}. REP. 93.
78. 2 LAUTERPACHT'S OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 62, 63 (7th ed. 1952).
79. DEPT. OF STATE BULLETIN 452 (1946). See also LISSITZYN, INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF JUSTICE 64 (1951). For criticism of the reservations of the United States,
see Preuss, The International Court oj Justice, The Senate and Matters oj Domestic
Jurisdiction, 40 AM. J. INT'L L. 720 (1946). But see Wilcox, The United States Accepts
Compulsory Jurisdiction, id. 699; Wright, The International Court oj Justice and the
InterPretation oj Multilateral Treaties, 41 id. 445 (1947).
80. LISSITZYN, op. cit. suPra note 79.
81. Id. at 65 n.47.
82. [1957] I.C.J. REp. 9.
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restrictively based on the narrower of the two declarations of ac-
ceptance, held that Norway, equally with France, was entitled to
except from compulsory jurisdiction of the Court disputes understood
by Norway to be essentially within its domestic jurisdiction. It
specifically reserved the question, not raised by the parties, whether
this type of reservation is "consistent with the undertaking of a legal
obligation" and compatible with other provisions of the Court's
Statute.83
That the unwillingness of national officials to concede compe-
tence to international tribunals shows little abatement is dramatically
•demonstrated by the Interhandel controversy between Switzerland
and the United States.84 The refusal of the United States to release
the assets seized during the war of a corporation, nominally Swiss but
allegedly controlled by a German concern, led to a charge that the
United States had violated a 1948 American-Swiss Accord, on un-
blocking of "Swiss" assets in the United States, and to a request for
arbitration pursuant to the 1931 treaty of pacific settlement between
the two countries. The United States in rejecting Switzerland's re-
quest for arbitration, claimed that the issue of the character of the
assets was in its determination as within its domestic jurisdiction.
Although the 1931 treaty simply excepted from arbitration matters
within the domestic jurisdiction of the respective parties, without
stipulating unilateral competence to determine such matters, the
United States has interpreted the phrase to mean that "decision on
what questions are within the domestic jurisdiction is, under the
Treaty, made unilaterally by each party for itself"85 a position which
has been described by Professor Briggs as an attempt to "extend
retroactively the stultifying effect" of the Connally reservation.86 Pro-
ponents of the State Department's interpretation rely upon older
practice of unilateral determination,87 but hardly meet Professor
Briggs' further criticism that the refusal of the United States to sub-
mit to arbitration "ill accords with its professed advocacy of the rule
of law in its international relations."88 This criticism acquired sharper
point when the United States resorted to the Connally' reservation to
escape the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice to which
Switzerland ultimately brought its case.89
83. [d. at 24.
84. The facts and contentions of the dispute are summarized in Briggs, Toward
the Rule of Law? 51 AM. J. hn'L L. 517 (1957).
85. U.S. Memorandum, 36 DEPT. OF STATE BULLETIN, 350, 357 (1957).
86. See note 84 suPra, at 529.
87. Jacoby, Toward the Rule of Law? 52 AM. J. hn'L L. 107 (1958).
88. See note 84 supra at 529.
89. [1957] I.e.}. REP. 105. The Swiss application asked the court to adjudge
whether the United States is under obligation to restore the assets to Interhande1, and,
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Counterbalancing Factors Favoring Effectiveness of Inclusive Policies
In modest counterbalance to these various factors limiting the
effectiveness of inclusive policies, there may be observed the consistent
willingness of international officials, when confronted with conflict
between international and national prescriptions, to apply the inter-
national. Thus in its Advisory Opinion on the Treatment of Polish
Nationals in Danzig, the Permanent Court, in determining that the
treatment of Polish Nationals in Danzig was to be evaluated in terms
of the requirements of the Treaty of Versailles and the Convention
of Paris and not of the Constitution of Danzig, offered in explanation
of its decision:
" [W] hile on the one hand, according to generally ac-
cepted principles, a State cannot rely, as against another
State, on the provisions of the latter's Constitution, but only
on international law and international obligations duly ac-
cepted, on the other hand and conversely, a State cannot
adduce as against another State its own Constitution with
a view to evading obligations incumbent upon it under in-
ternational law or treaties in force. Applying these prin-
ciples to the present case, it results that the question of the
treatment of Polish nationals . . . must be settled on the
bases of the rules of international law and the treaty pro-
visions in force between Poland and Danzig.mo
Again, in the Greco-Bulgarian "Communities" case, when asked
whether the demanded application of a treaty or a conflicting internal
law should prevail, the Permanent Court answered that local law
"would not prevail as against the convention" since "the provisions
of municipal law cannot prevail over those of the treaty."91 Other
decisions of the Court offer comparable illustration.92
The principle that international law, rather than conflicting na-
tional law, will determine states' rights and duties in the external
arena is equally well established in the jurisprudence of international
in the alternative, whether the dispute is one which is fit for submission to judicial
settlement, arbitration or conciliation. ld. at 106. A request for provisional measures
pending adjudication was rejected by the Court after declaration of the United States
Government it did not intend to sell the assets for the time being. ld. at 112. Five
judges, however, in three separate opinions, agreed in the result, but on tlte ground
tltat the objection under the Connally reservation precluded the Court from considering
tlte request for provisional measures. ld. at 113-20.
90. P.C.I.]., SER. A/B, No. 44 (1932), 24.
91. P.C.I.]., SER. B, No. 17 (1930), 32-35.
92. See the Free Zones case between France and Switzerland, id., Ser. A, No. 24
(1930), 12 "it is certain that France cannot rely on her own legislation to limit the
scope of her international obligations"; Case Concerning Certain German Interests in
Polish Upper Silesia (Merits), id. Ser. A, No.7 (1926), 19 "from the standpoint of
International Law and the Court which is its organ, municipal laws are merely facts
which express the will and constitute the activities of States ..."; Case Concerning
the Factory at Chorzow (Merits), id., Ser. A, No. 17 (1928), 33, 34.
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arbitral tribunals. "In thousands of decisions of international claims
tribunals," Professor Briggs has written (making broad reference to
cases upon matters as diverse as state succession, protection of aliens,
diplomatic immunities, neutrality, and the use of the oceans), "al-
legations that a State had incurred international responsibility through
denial of justice or kindred measures were tested by the standards of
international law rather than by municipal law or constitutional pro-
visions."93 The principle is precisely put in the well known statement
of Secretary Bayard, indicating the expectations of national officials:
"[I] f a government court set up its own municipal law
as the final test of its international rights and obligations,
then the rules of international law would be but the shadow
of a name and would afford no protection either to States
or to individuals. It has been constantly maintained and
also admitted by the Government of the United States that
a government cannot appeal to its municipal regulations as
an answer to the demands for the fulfillment of interna-
tional duties. Such regulations may either exceed or fall
short of the requirements of international law and in either
case that law furnishes the test of the nation's liability
and not its own municipallaw."94
Constitutional Limitations Increasingly Irrelevant
A factor perhaps even more propitious for the effectiveness of
inclusive policies than the consistent willingness of international
officials to prefer inclusive policies over exclusive, is the growing
acceptance of the view that states may not in conformity with inter-
national law interpose defects and inadequacies in their own consti-
tutions and practices against others as defenses to obligation under
either customary international law or agreements apparently au-
thoritatively concluded. Debate about this issue has centered largely
upon the degree of international obligation imposed upon a state by
an agreement, made by officials of apparent competence and within
apparent authority by internal law, but later claimed to have been
beyond such competence or authority or to require performance by
other agencies of government which cannot constitutionally be com-
93. BRIGGS, op. cit. supra note 11, at 62; see also BORCHARD, DIPLOMATIC PROTEC-
TION OF CITIZENS ABROAD (1915); WHITEMAN, DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1937-43) .
94. 2 MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 235 (1906). See also the Replies
of Governments to the Questionnaire of the Preparatory Committee for the Hague
Codification Conference, which showed "unanimous acceptance of the idea that the
responsibility of a State under international law for damage caused on its territory
to the person or the property of foreigners is distinct from its responsibility under its
own laws." 3 CONFERENCE FOR THE CODIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, BASES OF
DISCUSSION 16-19 (1929).
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pelled.95 Historic opinion has sought to distinguish between two dif-
ferent types of constitutional provisions, the one type of provision
relating to the "making," "concluding" or "entering into" agreements
and the other type relating to the "performance" of agreements. With
respect to the latter type of provision, relating to performance, opinion
has been for all practical purposes that internal inadequacies are no
defense to international obligation upon agreements properly made.
With respect to the former type of provision, relating to the making
or formation of agreements, controversy has been bitter, with con-
tending doctors in many varying arrays and shades of opinion,96 but
the principal views have been diametrically opposed: the one view
being that the competence of state officials to make international
agreements is determined only by national law and that any agree-
ment in excess of competence of authority creates no international
obligation, or at most only an obligation to pay damages; and the
other view, that the competence of officials is established only by
international law and that an agreement made by apparently com-
petent officials and within apparent authority creates international
obligation, irrespective of national law, constitutional or otherwise.
This distinction between the making and performance of agreements
is not, however, without its difficulties. The making of an interna-
tional agreement is a most complex process within all the interacting
bodies pOlitic, including at least such steps as: the formulation of
policies to guide negotiations, the actual conduct of negotiations, the
approval of policies for the purpose of making international commit-
ment, the approval of policies for authorizing internal application as
the law of the land, and final utterance or "ratification" of the agree-
ment as an external commitment of the whole body politic to others.97
Quite obviously some of these steps, such as approval for internal
application, shade imperceptibly into performance, and the apparently
clear-cut distinctions between "making" and "performing" and be-
tween "competence" and "authority as to content" may on occasion
become very fuzzy indeed. It is possible that the fundamental policies
at stake, both inclusive and exclusive, and the practical pressures at
work in the world arena may make the distinction largely irrelevant.
For clear and uncompromising statement of the generally agreed
95. Examples of constitutional restrictions on treaty-making power appear in
Harvard Research Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties, 29 AM. J. lNT'L L. (supp.)
992-94 (1935). A comprehensive, though dated, compilation is ARNOLD, TREATY-MAKING
PROCEDURE (1933) which may be checked against PEASLEE, CONSTITUTIONS OF NATIONS,
(2d ed. 1956).
96. Summary in Harvard Research, supra note 95, at 995-1002.
97. This point is developed in McDougal & Lans, Treaties and Congressional
Executive or Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy,
Part 1, 54 YALE L.J. 181,202 (1945).
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principle that, once an agreement is validly concluded by constitu-
tional criteria, a state may not escape performance of its international
obligation because of alleged inadequacies in its structures and proc-
esses of authority, we may turn to the Harvard Research. The black
letter reads:
"Unless otherwise provided in the treaty itself, a State
cannot justify its failure to perform its obligation under a
treaty because of any provision or omissions of its municipal
law, or because of any special features of its governmental
organization or its constitutional system."DS
Even more comprehensive in reach is the United Nations Declaration
of the Rights and Duties of States, Article 13 of which reads:
"Every State has the duty to carry out in good faith
its obligations arising from treaties and other sources of
international law, and it may not invoke provisions in its
constitution or its laws as an excuse for failure to perform
this duty."99
In its Advisory Opinion on the Exchange oj Greek and Turkish Popu-
lations, the Permanent Court stated as "self-evident" the principle
that "a State which has contracted valid international obligations is
bound to make in its legislation such modifications as may be necessary
to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken.moo In many
decisions, referred to above in our discussion of the traditional prefer-
ring by international officials of inclusive prescription, the Court re-
fused to accept the defense of conflict with internal constitutional,
statutory or judicial prescriptions.101 The same principle is illustrated
in the day-to-day practice of states by the common refusal of the
United States to accept pleas in defense to performance by other states
that they are "federal" states, with allegedly independent central and
provincial governments, and in the equally common refusal by other
states to accept the same self-serving plea when proffered by the
United States.102 The fundamental explanatory factor which underlies
this so wide acceptance of principle resides of course in general
recognition of the necessities for implementing inclusive policies: it
may safely be left to states to determine the methods, in internal
processes of authority, by which they implement inclusive policies, so
long as they measure up to the substance of obligation; it cannot
safely be left to states, after having accepted benefits to interpose
98. See note 95 supra, at 1029.
99. See note 48 supra.
100. P.C.I.]. SER. B, No. 10 (1925), 20.
101. See notes 90-92 supra and accompanying list.
102. Harvard Research, see note 95 supra, at 1040-55.
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their internal methods in authority to defeat the substance of common
responsibility. The general community interest finds sanction, as
often, in withheld benefits or threatened retaliations.
Some similar consensus of opinion, stimulated by recognition of
the same or comparable necessities, appears to be in slow process of
formation even with respect to constitutional provisions of the type
said to relate to the making of agreements. The position that national
law largely governs the competency of state officials and that astate
is not bound, apart from a possible liability to pay damages, by an
agreement concluded by an incompetent organ or agent was taken
by the Harvard Research and by Sir Hersch Lauterpacht when he
was rapporteur on Treaties for the United Nations International Law
Commission.loa The opposing view, that international law governs
and that states are bound to full performance of agreements concluded
by apparently competent organs and within apparent authority, is
however, taken, and supported with cogent reasoning, by the present
rapporteur of that commission, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice,l°4 and this
position would appear to be much more in accord both with the more
recent authoritative decision and with the relevant policies and in-
escapable pressures in the practice of states.
Both the type of problem and recent authoritative decision may
be illustrated by reference to the famous Eastern Greenland case.105
In this case the Norwegian Foreign Minister made an oral statement,
in the course of agreement, to his Danish counterpart, that the N or-
wegian Government would not oppose a proposed extension of Danish
sovereignty over Greenland. To a Norwegian contention that such
oral promise, since relating to matter of "special importance" and
not submitted to a Ministers' Council as constitutionally required for
such matters, was not binding obligation, the Permanent Court
answered:
"The Court considers it beyond dispute that a reply
of this nature given by the Minister for Foreign Affairs on
behalf of his government in regard to a question falling
within his province is binding upon the country to which the
Minister belongs.mOG
The Harvard Research suggests, in attempted distinguishing of the
case, that, since the Court apparently thought the oral declaration was
"within the province" of the Minister, the decision is of no authority
103. For the Harvard Research Draft see note 95 supra at 992. For Judge
Lauterpacbt's Report, see U.N. Doc. No. A/CN. 4/63, Art. 11 (1953).
104. Art. 10, U.N. Doc. No. A/eN. 4/115 (1958).
105. P.C.I.]., SER. AlB No. 53 (1933).
106. Id. at 71.
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with respect to the problem of an incompetent agent.107 This argu-
ment ignores that competency was directly in issue in the case. In
any event, comparable attitudes on facts unquestionably raising the
issue might be cited in other important cases.lOS
From the practice of states even more persuasive illustration of
contemporary attitude may be adduced. In connection with the
establishment of the St. Lawrence Seaway Project, opponents of the
project contended that Canada could not safely rely upon the pro-
posed participation of the United States by way of congressional-
executive agreement, since such participation would not comply with
the constitutional provision about the making of treaties. Opinions
on the point were offered by both the Legal Adviser of the United
States Department of State and the Legal Adviser of the Department
of External Affairs of Canada. The first of these advisers, later to
become a judge of the International Court of Justice, Judge Hack-
worth, stated:
"Generally speaking ... in international law the Head
of the government is entitled to speak for the state, and if
the President enters into an obligation with a foreign gov-
ernment, that foreign government is entitled to rely upon it.
It is not under the obligation to enquire into our constitu-
tional processes. It takes the word of the Head of State.
If the obligation is violated, it is a violation of international
law, pure and simple, whether the President exceeds his
authority or not. He is supposed to act within his authority,
but if he ge~s outside it, the other government is entitled to
rely upon it. ll109
The second adviser (also later to become a judge of the International
Court of Justice, Judge Read) was even more emphatic. His words
were:
"Notwithstanding the difficulty in pronouncing upon a
question of this sort, closely related to the constitutional
law of the United States, it is submitted:
(a) That an Agreement based upon the legislative au-
thority of Congress would give rise to a valid
obligation, recognized by the Courts of the United
States;
107. See note 95 supra, at 1007.
108. See cases collected in HENDRY, TREATIES AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS 153-54
(1955); McNAIR, LAW OF TREATIES ch. 3 (1933). See also Hudson, The Argentine
Republic and the League oj Nations, 28 AM. J. INT'L L. 125, 132 (1934).
109. Hearings bejore a Subcommittee oj the Committee on Commerce on S. 1385,
a Bill to Provide jor the Improvement oj the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Basin in the
Interest oj National Defense, 78th CONGo 2D SESS. 235 (1944).
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(b) That it would not be possible for a Government
of the United States, either in diplomatic nego-
tiation or in the course of arbitration before an
international tribunal, successfully to challenge
the validity of such an Agreement as creating an
obligation recognized in International Law and
cognizable by international tribunals.
"In considering this problem, it is necessary to go be-
hind the screen of legalism and to examine fundamental
aspects of the problem. The strength of a St. Lawrence pact
would not lie in legalistic concepts. It would lie in the fact
that a state of affairs had been brought about which could
only work on the basis of both countries loyally carrying
out their undertakings.1l110
It was not of course necessary for the legal adviser representing
Canada to emphasize the practical sanctions which would be at the
disposal of his Government in the "state of affairs brought about"
if the United States should later profess a constitutional defect in
its undertaking.
The most important policy at stake in this issue from the per-
spective of the general community of states, would appear to be
maintenance of a certain stability in the expectations states reason-
ably create in each other by their agreements. The expectations
reasonably created would not appear to vary directly with nice dis-
crimination about the obscure distinctions between constitutional
provisions which relate to the making of agreements and those that
relate to the performance of agreements. Exactly the same sanctions
in reciprocity and retaliation are, furthermore, at the disposal of
states who regard themselves as deprived by failure of performance,
irrespective of such distinctions. The accelerating interdependence
of social processes which gives even sharper bite to such sanctions,
similarly, knows no such distinctions. There would, accordingly,
appear to be wisdom deserving further acceptance, in the recent con-
clusions of Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice:
"For the purpose of this part of the present code, con-
sent means consent on the international plane, and the reality
of such consent is not impaired by the fact that, on the
domestic plane, certain consents are lacking; or that there
has otherwise been a failure by the State concerned, or its
authorities, to observe the correct constitutional processes
as required by the domestic law for the purpose of pro-
ceeding to signature, ratification, accession or other act of
110. Quoted in McDougal & Lans, supra note 97, at 325 n.84.
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participation in the treaty; or to keep within any limitations
on the treaty-making power imposed by the domestic law
or constitution."111
It remains of course a defect in world processes of authority that
only the most minimal and indirect requirements are imposed upon
states for maintaining effective agreement-making and performing pro-
cedures. The state which wishes to constitute itself a cripple-for
example, by presenting itself as a "federal" state in external arenas-
is still authorized in considerable measure to effect such incapacita-
tion. Accepted policies do not require a state either to participate in
processes of peaceful interaction with other states or to maintain
effective institutions for such participation. When Lord Atkin, speak-
ing for the Privy Council in the Labor Conventions Case,ll2 holding
that acceptance of the conventions by the Canadian national govern-
ment still left performance to the discretion of the provinces, stated,
"It must not be thought that the result of this decision is that Canada
is incompetent to legislate in the performance of treaty obligations"
and added, "In totality of legislative powers, Dominion and Pro-
vincial, she is fully equipped," he was addressing himself more to the
heaven of juristic conceptions and fantasy than to the world of fact.
The consequences for Canada have been comprehensively summarized
by Professor Maxwell Cohen:
". . . [T] he inability of the Parliament of Canada to
implement international agreements except where the sub-
ject matters of the obligations already are within its consti-
tutional jurisdiction has a limiting effect on the international
position of Canada in fact if not in external legal posture.
Today in many matters of economic and social policy-
prices, production, industrial standards, civil liberties, for
example-parallel provincial legislation may be necessary
to enable Canada to enforce municipally any international
undertakings in these fields. The administrative and political
cumbersomeness as well as the negotiating inconvenience of
this position at once will be evident. Canada has already its
'Bricker Amendment' and it may require major constitu-
tional re-appraisal to resolve this difficulty ...."113
Certainly it could not be in either the general community interest or
even the shortest-term national interest of the United States for the
United States to adopt a constitutional amendment which would com-
mit it to an even sadder posture of incapacity, with fifty vetoes
111. Art. 10, U.N. Doc. No. A/CN. 4/115 (1958).
112. [1937] A.C. 326.
113. Cohen, Some International Law Problems of Interest to Canada and to the
Canadian Lawyers, 33 CAN. B. REv. 389, 396 (1955).
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over policies affecting national survival. Whatever its accuracy as a
history of legal technicality, Mr. Justice Holmes' famous dictum in
Missouri v. Holland that "it is not lightly to be assumed that, in mat-
ters requiring national action, 'a power which must belong to and
somewhere reside in every civilized government' is not to be found,1l114
assuredly expresses a most profound truth about the realities of the
contemporary world power process. Though the niceties of accepted
inclusive prescription may not yet require states to put forward com-
petent agents to' discharge common responsibility, the necessities of
survival in an interdependent world may serve better.
II.
THE ApPLICATION OF INCLUSIVE POLICIES IN INTERNAL ARENAS
From describing the prescription and application of inclusive
polices in external arenas through the interactions of states as com-
posite bodies politic and by the functioning of international govern-
mental organizations, we now turn to the application of such in-
clusively prescribed policies by state officials· in arenas established by
the internal structures of authority of particular states. Such applica-
tion is with respect to claims for the regulation of interactions, whether
within or outside territorial boundaries, which involve either
private individuals and groups, or state officials engaging in activities
not regarded as committing the total policy of their states. Many
inclusively prescribed policies, such as are frequently found in multi-
lateral treaties projecting uniform practices about common problems,
cannot of course be made effective without such internal application
by states, and fortunately it may be observed, when the world scene
is viewed as a whole, that there appears to be an increasing uniformity
and effectiveness in the unilateral application of inclusively prescribed
policies by state officials acting within the internal structures of their
territorial bodies politic. It is by such internal application that the
states both further their policies with respect to each other and, as a
general community of states, attempt to subordinate that host of other
participants in the world power process-individuals, political parties,
pressure groups, and multitudinous private associations of varying
base and scope values-to their common policies. Conversely, of
course, it is by this internal application that such other participants
achieve an added measure of protective access to processes of au-
thority transcending state lines.
114. 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920). See also McDougal & Leighton, The Rights of
Man in the World Community: Constitutional Illusions versus Rational Action, 59
YALE L.]. 60, 90-106 (1949). Pertinent policy issues are raised and discussed in
Mathews, The Constitutional Power of the President to Conclude International Agree-
ments, 64 YALE L.J. 345 (1955).
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The suggestion is sometimes made that when policies, though
externally prescribed, are applied internally by states, such policies
cease to be international law and become merely national law. This
type of suggestion, contrary to the familiar dictum of the bard of
Avon that a rose by any other name smells just as sweet, is little more
than a statement of preferred taste for one label rather than another.
One advantage of an analysis in terms of interpenetrating power
processes and distinguishable functions of prescribing and applying
is in the indication of the irrelevance of such gustatory jurisprudence.
The important facts are that the policies put into practice are, on the
one hand, externally and inclusively prescribed, and, on the other
hand, internally and effectively applied, whatever adjective is placed
before the word "law" and wherever "supremacy" may be located.
The hard reality is of course, despite favorable trends toward
effectiveness, that complete conformity to inclusive prescription by
internal application is not achieved, and is probably not achievable.
The perfectionist ideal of total effectiveness is obstructed by many
limiting factors. The modalities in principle and procedure by which
states make externally prescribed policy "authority" for internal
decision-makers differ greatly in efficiency, and vary from customary
law to agreements. The types of interactions with respect to which
inclusive policies are projected may deeply affect the value positions
of effective participants in internal power processes, who may thus im-
pede acceptance and enforcement of authority. When externally pre-
scribed policies and internal prescriptions conflict, some state officials
may be moved by varying predispositions to employ artistry in inter-
pretation in order to avoid application of inclusive policy; and state
judicial officials may on occasion, for purposes of maintaining unity
in foreign policy or of avoiding responsibility for decision, under the
doctrine of "political questions" pass responsibility for internal ap-
plications to state executive officials. Fortunately for inclusive policy,
state executive officials, responsible for the total policy of their body
politic, do remain committed by effective processes of authority in
external arenas, notwithstanding any limiting factors in their internal
structures and process, and when thUS, the judiciary of a state declines
to apply international law internally, the executive of the state may
recognize, or be compelled to recognize, the international obligation.
For defalcations in internal arenas there is in effect authorized appeal
to external arenas.
More detailed exploration of the interrelations of inclusive pre-
scription and internal application may perhaps most economically
proceed by making reference, first to the modalities by which states
HeinOnline -- 4 S.D. L. Rev. 68 1959
68 SOUTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4
establish the authority of inclusive policies for their internal decision-
makers and to the types of interactions with respect to which internal
application of inclusive policies is commonly demanded; then to
certain factors more explicitly limiting the degree and effectiveness of
internal application of inclusive policies; and finally to the practice
of appeal for non-application or misapplication in internal arenas to
external arenas.
We begin with the modalities in principle and procedure by which
states establish inclusively prescribed policies as authority within
their internal arenas, for application to claimants contending in such
arenas, and will deal with both customary international law and
agreements.
Internal Application oj Customary International Law
First, customary international law. By internal application of
customary international law we refer to the process of decision by
which officials who are authorized to apply inclusive policies in internal
arenas make reference, for purpose of finding out what such inclusive
policies are, to certain past uniformities in behavior, such uniformities
allegedly offering good evidence of community expectation because
of their having occurred in accordance with perspectives of the par-
ticipants that such behavior was required. ll5 It is no new story, how-
ever, that both the past uniformities in behavior, the "material" ele-
ment, and the subjectivities of "oughtness" the psychological element
or opinio juris, commonly stipulated as indispensable prerequisites for
authorizing a decision-maker to turn to "custom" as a source of policy,
admit of many varying and flexible interpretations. The relevant uni-
formities in behavior may include acts not only of officials, national
and international, at many different positions in structures of author-
ity, but even of individuals and representatives of private associa-
tions. Such acts may obviously vary enormously in the amount of
repetition they reveal and in the length of time through which such
repetition occurs. The subjectivities of.oughtness attending such uni-
formities in behavior may refer to many different systems of norms-
past decisions, morality, natural law, religion-or may be non-existent
or non-provable, or may in their beginning be positively unlawful if
judged by past authoritative decisions. "Sometimes," as Professor
Kopelmanas has well said, "it is merely the satisfactory and rea-
sonable character of the custom which allows a decision whether a
particular rule has or has not the character of a legal rule."116 Simi-
115. BRIGGs, op. cit. supra note 11, at 24.
116. Kopelmanas, Custom as a Means oj the Creation oj International Law, 18
BRIT. YB. INT'L L. 127, 151 (1937).
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lady, the factual or literary sources to which a national official, as an
international official, may turn for information about both past behavior
and subjectivities are multiple and various, including international
agreements, diplomatic correspondence, resolutions of international
organizations, a great variety of utterances by international and na-
tional officials, the opinions of text-writers, community myth about
the requirements of good faith and equity, and so on.117 In a process
so open and fluid, it should be clear that one function of a doctrine of
"custom" is to enable decision-makers within a state to respond easily
and economically, without special procedures or proofs and without
too apparent subordination to external pressures, to the requirements
of shared and inclusively prescribed policies.
From the perspective of the world power and social processes,
as we have sketched them above, there is indeed no need for a state
to adopt any special principles or procedures for making customary
international law autho'rity within its boundaries. The influence of
inclusively prescribed policies depends not so much upon internal
arrangements as upon the impact of external variables in the world
power process-including all potential reciprocities and threatened re-
taliations-which drive a decision-maker toward conformity or non-
conformity. The dynamic factors, explanatory of decision, embrace
both the internal decision-maker's conceptions of the source and con-
tent of authority and his estimate of the sanctions at the disposal of
participants asserting the relevance of inclusive prescription. The in-
sistent pressures of the world power process impose certain sources
and content of authority, sustained by effective sanctions, upon in-
ternal decision-makers if they are to maximize the values of the
national community with which they identify. The particular states
do not so much have the option asserted by some traditional theories,
of "adopting" the world power process, as the chance to make the
most of it. For extraordinarily deep insight into this reality, reference
may be made to the case of Lauritzen 'lJ. Larsen,1l8 in which the Su-
preme Court of the United States, refusing to permit application of
the Jones Act to claims by a Danish seaman injured upon a Danish
ship in Havana harbor, interpreted congressional legislation restric-
tively so as not to conflict with customary international law relating
to the law of the flag. Speaking for the Court, Mr. Justice Jackson
said:
"International or maritime law in such matters as this
does not seek uniformity and does not purport to restrict
any nation from making and altering its laws to govern its
117. Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.
118. 345 U.S. 571 (1953).
HeinOnline -- 4 S.D. L. Rev. 70 1959
70 SOUTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4
own shipping and territory. However, it aims at stability
and order through usages which considerations of comity,
reciprocity and long-range interest have developed to define
the domain which each nation will claim as its own. Mari-
time law, like our municipal law, has attempted to avoid or
resolve conflicts between competing laws by ascertaining and
valuing points of contact between the transactions and the
states of governments whose competing laws are involved.
The criteria, in general, appear to be arrived at from weigh-
ing of the significance of one or more connecting factors
between the shipping transaction regulated and the national
interest served by the assertion of authority. It would not be
candid to claim that our courts have arrived at satisfactory
standards or apply those that they profess with perfect con-
sistency. But in dealing with international commerce we
cannot be unmindful of the necessity for mutual forbear-
ance if retaliations are to be avoided; nor should we forget
that any contact which we hold sufficient to warrant applica-
tion of our law to a foreign transaction will logically be as
strong a warrant for a foreign country to apply its law to
an American transaction."1l9
Oblique recognition of this same reality pervades the common doctrine
that, though the authority of the whole process of customary inter-
national law depends upon the general consensus of states, the author-
ity of any particular rule does not require universal consent or even
the prior consent of the state making application. It is not necessary,
as Lauterpacht's Oppenheim puts the point, "to prove for every single
rule of international law that every single member of the international
community has consented to it.1l120 The application of inclusive pre-
scription to sovereign bodies is, however, made more palatable by the
assumption, as Professor Silving points out, that "courts merely find
what the obligations already accepted by the states in fact are." "The '
feeling prevails," she writes, "that in the case of a mere law finding
the 'personal juristic situation' of the states is left intact so that, in
essence, the states remain as free as before.1l121
It has of course been explicitly accepted doctrine in many states,
almost since Grotius first added to divine law and natural law a
secular source of authority in the consensus of states, that interna-
tionallaw is a part of the law of the land to be interpreted and applied
in appropriate cases, without special procedures or proofs, as other
law is. The historic predispositions which gave impetus to this com-
119. Id. at 582.
120. 1 LAUTERPACHT'S OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 18 (8th ed. 1955).
121. Silving, "Customary Law": Continuity in Municipal and International Law,
31 IOWA L. REV. 614, 631, n.54 (1946).
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mon conclusion have been most eloquently stated by Professor
Dickinson:
"In the first place, it is to be emphasized that the doc-
trine of incorporation in its original significance was, for the
English Courts, a perfectly natural deduction from the
theories of national and international law which flourished
in the 17th and 18th centuries. All law, national no less than
international, was being tested by the standards of what was
assumed to be a rational, universal, and immutable system.
The English Courts were developing English national law in
harmony, as it was assumed, with right reason and natural
justice. It was even doubted whether the courts should re-
spect an act of parliament which was repugnant to universal
principles. International law was not only in harmony with
right reason and natural justice, but was a veritable corpus
juris naturalis in the treatises of the most influential pub-
licists. In an age dominated by such ideas, nothing could
have been more plausible than the conclusion that interna-
tional law formed an integral part of the national law gov-
erning matters of international concern."122
With the ascendance many decades later of more "positivistic" legal
philosophies, philosophies emphasizing past decisions as sources of
authority, Professor Dickinson finds only the minor change that "the
law of nations" becomes "a source" rather than an "integral part" of
national law, with "the national law governing matters of interna-
tional concern" being derived "in the absence of a controlling statute,
executive decision, or judicial precedent from such relevant principles
of the law of nations as can be shown to have received the nations
implied or express consent.1l123 From the perspective of law as a
process of authoritative decision, rather than of rules, even this change
is obviously a distinction without a difference: the source of authority
is an integral element of the process of decision and, if inclusive
policies are in fact internally applied, it matters little, as we have
seen, which adjective, national or international, is prefixed to the
word law. For a single illustration, from among the countless pos-
sibilities, of the important fact of internal application, we refer to the
famous case of The Paquete Habana,124 in which the Supreme Court
held that small fishing boats were not by customary international law
subject to confiscation as prize. Reviewing the many possible sources
of international authority, Justice Gray said simply:
122. Dickinson, Changing Concepts and the Doctrine of Incorporation, 26 AM.
J. INT'L L. 239, 253 (1932).
123. Id. at 260. Lauterpacht, Is International Law Part of the Law of England,
25 Th. GROTIUS Soc. 51, 86 offers persuasive criticism of this distinction.
124. 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
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"International law is part of our law, and must be
ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of
appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right de-
pending upon it are duly presented for their determina-
tion.1H25
For more complete indication of the irrelevance of the traditional
philosophies of monism and dualism with which we began our inquiry,
it may be added that these contending philosophies, despite their
varying emphasis upon international and national perspectives, appear
to have had but little effect upon the actual trend in decision of con-
sistent internal application of inclusive policy. Logically, the dualist
doctrine, with its insistence that international law applies only to
relations between states and cannot be directly applied to individuals
and private associations, would appear to require that every particular
rule of international law. must be specifically "transformed" from its
international origins into national law prior to any particular applica-
tion.126 State officials, however, continuously make application of
inclusive policies in internal arenas without demanding or awaiting
such prior approval and, as summarized by one distinguished com-
mentator, who curiously still finds some meaning in the word "trans-
formation," there would appear, save possibly for one disputed English
decision, "no case" in which a court has "refused to give effect to a
. rule of customary international law because it had 'not been expressly
incorporated into national law.1H27 The doctrines of the monists,
similarly, with their varying emphasis both upon the identity of inter-
national law and national law in sources of "validity" and entities
governed and upon the supremacy of international law, would appear
logically to require that international law be directly applied in internal
arenas by state officials, without any prior general or specific ac-
ceptance by the state and perhaps even despite aberrant rejection by
the state. Most monists, however, apparently contemplate some kind
of state "incorporation" or "adoption" of externally prescribed pol-
icies128 and rare are the suggestions, even unofficial, that a state may
not in its own internal constitutional structures determine or change
the modalities by which it performs its international obligations-
including such obligations as require the internal application of in-
clusive policies. The fact is that such terms as "transformation,"
"incorporation" and "adoption" are but metaphors of ill-defined ref-
erence, deriving whatever meaning they have from the limiting con-
125. Id. at 700.
126. Morgenstern, Judicial Practice and the Supremacy of International Law, 27
BRIT. YB. INT'L L. 42, 50 (1950).
127. [d. at 52.
128. Id. at 60.
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ception of law, international and national, as abstracted rules. When
"transformation" of international law is made inherent in the very
act of applying national law, the difference between "transformation"
and all contrasting concepts becomes that of tweedledum and tweedle-
dee. A conception of law as a process of authoritative decision has
no difficulty in describing how policies prescribed in one arena, the
external, may be applied in another, the internal.
As evidence of a perhaps increasing willingness of state officials
to facilitate internal application of inclusively prescribed policies may
be noted certain recent developments in the establishing of national
structures of authority, with such structures modified to ease the
pains of introjection. Since World War II, at least fourteen states,
of widely scattered geographic range and of greater and.lesser power,
have formally declared in their constitutions the "binding effect" of
international customary law, authorizing its internal application.129
The language of acceptance ranges from Burma's highly generalized
adherence to "the generally recognized principles of international
law," through East Germany's recognition that "the generally recog-
nized principles of international law are binding on the state authority
and every citizen," to a culminating peak in West Germany's pro-
vision both that "general rules of international law shall form part of
federal law" and that such rules "shall take precedence over the laws
and create rights and duties directly for the inhabitants of the federal
territory.m30 This most significant trend in constitution making has
received a sharp and illustrative summary by Professor Deener:
"In the Near East, the Draft Constitution of Israel
states, 'the generally recognized rules of international law
shall form part of the municipal law of Israel.' The Consti-
tution of South Korea declares that 'the generally recognized
rules of international law shall be valid as a binding con-
stituent part of the law of Korea.' The Japanese Constitu-
tion proclaims that the Constitution is the supreme law of
the nation and that no public act contrary to its provisions
shall have legal force or validity, and continues, 'The treaties
concluded by Japan and established laws of nations shall
be faithfully observed.' By its Constitution, the Philippines
'adopts the generally accepted principles of international law
as part of the law of the Nation.' Four recent European con-
stitutions contain incorporative clauses."131
The range and importance of the international customary policies
129. Deener, International Law Provisions in Post-World War II Constitutions,
36 CORNELL L.Q. 50S, 523-26 (1951).
130. Ibid.
131. Id. at 525-26.
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achieving, whatever the procedures, internal application, may be
indicated by reference in topical terms to the subject matter of cases
in constant flow through national courts. Comprehensive itemization
would touch every important aspect of the world power process and
might include, for brief illustration, such matters in dispute as the
following: 132
claims about the consequences of the recognition and
nonrecognition of states and private associations;
claims by state officials and representatives of private
associations for physical access to territory, and with or
without special authorization, to engage in varying internal
activities;
claims by state officials and private individuals for ac-
cess to courts and other arenas of authority;
claims with respect to the validity and consequences of
acquisition of territory and controversies about boundaries;
claims with respect to use and exploitation of shareable
and strategic resources, such as the oceans, international
rivers, and airspace;
claims with respect to nationality, the granting of asylum
to aliens, the banishment of citizens, and the treatment or
expulsion of aliens;
claims with respect to diplomatic immunities and facil-
ities;
claims about the formation, application, and inter-
pretation of agreements;
claims about the legal consequences of the initiation,
conduct, and termination of hostilities;
claims with respect to varying modalities in coercion
and deprivation;
claims with respect to jurisdiction over particular events,
both within and beyond boundaries; and
claims with respect to state immunities, acts of state,
and state succession.
Internal Application of International Agreements
Next, we turn to the principles and procedures by which states
make policies inclusively prescribed by international agreement "au-
thority" for application within their internal processes. The principal
132. See Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Part of the National Law of the
United States, II, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 792 (1953) (American cases) ; Hyde, The Supreme
Court of the United States As an Expositor of International Law, 18 BRIT. YB. INT'L
L. 1 (1937) (same); Lauterpacht, Is International Law a Part of the Law of England,
25 TR. GROTIUS Soc. 51 (1940) (English cases); MACKENZIE & LIANG, CANADA AND TIlE
LAW OF NATIONS (1938) (Canadian cases).
For amplification with respect to values other than power affected by customary
international law, see McDougal and Lasswell, supra note 2.
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concern of states is of course only for those agreements which they
intend to have applied within their boundaries and whose perform-
ance, in fulfillment of international obligation, requires such internal
application. Though almost any international agreement may on
occasion be invoked in internal arenas, some agreements such as for
pacific settlement of international disputes or for the guarantee of
the security or neutralization of a state, may require for performance
only the most modest degree of application in internal arenas. For
making those agreements whose performance does require internal
application the law of the land, state constitutions exhibit two mo-
dalities in procedure, which though differing in form appear in their
allocation of effective competence to be substantial equivalents. The
first modality is illustrated by constitutional provisions which stipu-
late that certain agreements, made in certain ways, under certain con-
ditions, become the law of the land, and the second modality by
constitutional requirements that certain agreements must have special
legislative or parliamentary approval before becoming the law of
the land.
The historic model of the first modality, dispensing with special
parliamentary approval and making certain agreements automatically
authoritative in internal processes, is of course Article VI(2) of the
United States Constitution. This famous provision, applied in almost
countless instances in all kinds of internal arenas, reads:
"[A]ll Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law
of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State
to the Contrary notwithstanding."
Far from being so unique, as some contemporary protagonists of
constitutional reform assert, this model has, further, been increasingly
followed, as, for example, in Article 22 of the 1949 Argentine, Article
7 of the 1946 Korean, Article 133 of the 1917 Mexican, and Article 4
of the 1940 Paraguayan, Constitutions.133 Similarly, Article 26 of
the 1946 French Constitution reads:
"Diplomatic treaties duly ratified and published shall
have the force of law even when they are contrary to internal
French legislation; they shall require for their application no
legislative acts other than those necessary to ensure ratifica-
tion."
Beyond formal constitutional provision to this effect, several states
133. These constitutional provisions, as well as those hereinafter cited, are taken
from PEASLEE, CONSTITUTIONS OF NATIONS (2d ed. 1956).
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have even by customary decision achieved procedures roughly com-
parable to the American model, as for example, Cuba, the German
Federal Republic and Switzerland.134
Within the United States, the greatest difficulty encountered in
applying Article VI(2) has been in identifying the agreements in fact
intended to become immediately operative in internal arenas without
further legislative action. Most often this issue has been posed in
terms of a highly artificial dichotomy between agreements described
as "self-executing" and not "self-executing.1l135 The fountain-head
posing in these terms goes back to Chief Justice Marshall in Foster v.
N eilson.136 In passing upon bitterly contested claims to land titles,
dependent upon alternative interpretations of the treaty with Spain
for cession of Florida, the great Chief Justice said:
"A treaty is in its nature a contract between two nations,
not a Legislative Act. It does not generally effect, of itself,
the object to be accomplished, especially so far as its opera-
tion is infraterritorial; but is carried into execution by the
sovereign power of the respective parties to the instrument.
"In the United States a different principle is established.
Our Constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land.
It is, consequently to be regarded in Courts of Justice as
equivalent to an Act of the Legislature, whenever it operates
of itself without the aid of any legislative provision. But
when the terms of the stipulation import a contract-when
either of the parties engages to perform a particular act-the
treaty addres.ses itself to the political, not the judicial de-
partment; and the Legislature must execute the contract
before it can become a rule for the Court.1l137
Most recently Professor Alona Evans has reformulated this famous
distinction in a way to make the tautology more explicitly evident.
Her words are: <
"A self-executing treaty is one which furnishes a rule
for the executive branch of the Government, the courts, the
States, and private individuals, either by operation of its
134. Dihigo, Treaties as lAw in the National Courts: lAtin America, 16 LA. L.
REV. 734, 741 (1956); Preuss, The Execution of Treaty Obligations-System of the
United States and of Some Other Countries, 45 PROC. AM. Soc'v INT'L L. 82, 93-95
(1951).
It is not clear what changes have been effected under the new Constitution of 1958,
adopted under the leadership of General DeGaulle. The language of the relevant
articles, Art. 52-55, is highly cryptic and ambiguous. See New York Times, Sept. 5,
1958, p. 10,
135. The problem is encountered in other countries too. See Preuss, On Amending
the Treaty-Making Power: A Comparative Study of the Problem of Self-Executing
Treaties, 51 MICH. L. REV. 1117 (1953).
136. 27 U,S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829).
137. Id. at 314.
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own terms or because it can be implemented by the executive
branch or the States without Congressional intervention. On
the other hand, a non-self-executing treaty is one which re-
quires implementation by Congress before it can be enforced
as the supreme law of the land.1I13s
When the precise issue before a decision-maker is whether some fur-
ther legislative act is required, it obviously assists the resolution of
this issue but little to proclaim that if the agreement is self-executing
no further action is required, but that if it is non-self-executing, fur-
ther action is required. The words self-executing and non-self-ex-
ecuting embrace neither intrinsic or historic meaning nor magic to
resolve the issue. When draftsmen think of the problem, language
can be used precise enough to make intention clear, as for example
in the Genocide Convention which requires "necessary legislation to
give effect to the provisions of the present convention." When drafts-
men do not think of the problem, subsequent decision-makers are
thrown back upon examination of all relevant indicia of intent in
context.
Excellent illustration of this examination of the indicia of intent
in context is offered by the famous Sei Fujii case,139 which supplied·
the great impetus to the Bricker fantasy. The issue before the Su-
preme Court of California was whether the United Nations Charter,
with its promises by the signatories in Articles 1, 55, and 56 "to
promote" and "to take joint action in cooperation" for achievement
of universal human rights was appropriate authority for invalidating
the California alien land law. Taking into account all the circum-
stances attending the framing of the Charter, the precise language in
terms of "promise" rather than "execution," the prior use of com-
parable language, and the use of other language in the Charter to
achieve internal application for other purposes, the Court concluded
against automatic internal application. It said:
"The provisions in the charter pledging cooperation in
promoting observance of fundamental freedoms lack the
mandatory quality and definiteness which would indicate an
intent to create justiciable rights in private persons imme-
diately upon ratification. Instead, they are framed as a
promise of future action by the member nations.1I140
It was of course only irony, and not contradiction, that in subsequent
portions of its opinion the court read the content of the human rights
138. Evans, Some Aspects of the Problem of Self-Executing Treaties, 45 Paoc.
AM. SOC'Y WT'L L. 66, 73-4 (1951).
139. Sei Fujii v. State, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952).
140. /d. at 621-22.
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provisions into the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Con-
stitution to invalidate the California law as a denial of equal pro-
tection. Decision by one justification can not be as sweet as another
and rules must be kept clear and distinct wh~tever the processes and
direction of decision!
In supposed, fundamental contrast to the constitutional provi-
sions and practices stipulating automatic internal authority are the
requirements in many states for a further legislative act, with respect
to certain agreements, to authorize internal applications. This may
be illustrated by reference to Great Britain, prime advocate of par-
liamentary supremacy, whose practice has been aptly summed up by
Lord McNair:
"Accordingly, if the Crown enters into a treaty which is
likely to come into question in a Court of law or to require
for its enforcement the assistance of a Court of law, and the
application and enforcement of that treaty involves any
modification of or addition to the rules of law administered
by an English Court (which include the rules of interna-
tionallaw as understood and ascertained by English Courts),
the Crown must induce Parliament to pass the necessary
legislation, for it is only Parliament that can change the law
binding upon an English Court. This question can arise
either upon a treaty which merely cr~ates a particular obli-
gation between the parties, or upon a treaty which purports
to create new rules of international law binding upon a num-
ber of parties."141
Illustration of formal constitutional requirement of legislative ap-
proval for making certain international agreements the law of the
land could be offered from many countries.142
It is suggested that the commonly made distinction between the
United States and British models is more supposed than fundamental
for reasons easily made obvious.143 The fact that the United States
Senate participates in the "making" of a treaty in the United States
supplies from the very inception of international obligation a pre-
existing legislative approval. The vote of the Senate performs the
function of legislation as much when making a treaty as when en-
acting a statute, and in fact because of the requirement of a special
two-thirds majority for approval, the United States Constitution im-
141. McNair, The Method Whereby International Law Is Made to Prevail in
Municipal Courts on an Issue of International Law, 30 TR. GROTIUS Soc. 11, 19 (1945).
142. See, e.g., Deener, supra note 129, at 528, n.146; Vanek, Is International Law
Part of the Law of Canada? 8 U. OF TORONTO L.J. 251, 265 (1950).
143. The distinction outlined in BRIGGS, op. cit. supra note 11, at 86 is somewhat
too facile.
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poses a much more onerous requirement of legislation than that im-
posed in any other major state, including Britain. Conversely, in
Britain, with its special parliamentary system, legislative and exec-
utive responsibility are so fused, that legislative approval of agree-
ments made by the executive is seldom difficult to secure, and is in
fact often secured in advance.
The most onerous constitutional requirements for making agree-
ments the law of the land, are of course to be found in those federal
states whose constitutions require} in addition to approval by a na-
tional legislature, approval by the legislatures of internal provinces.
This would appear, as we have seen, to be the requirement in Canada,
though scholars dispute as to what future decision there may be.l44
In contrast, the statesmanship of Missouri v. Holland145 has thus far
saved the. United States from the same sad posture, but it is precisely
such international incapacity that the proposed Bricker Amendment,
whatever its version, would impose upon the United States.146 It will
be recalled that in one version of this proposal, the much-mooted
"which" clause read:
"A treaty shall become effective as internal law in the
United States only through legislation which would be valid
in the absence of treaty.1l147
The proponents of this clause-and some equivalent wording was
invariably included in all the ill-born versions-never permitted doubt
that it was intended to take power from the nation and to give to the
internal states, in the form of individual veto, the competence to
authorize or withhold internal application of certain agreements
made by the nation.
The importance from inclusive perspectives, which take into
account the common interests of states, of efficient national procedures
for making international agreements internal authority may be dem-
onstrated by reference both to the broad range in subject-matter of
past international agreements and to the probably expanding range
in future agreements. Professor Hendry has put the double point
concisely, eloquently and briefly:
"One has only to pursue Professor Hudson's compre-
hensive work to obtain a perspective of the multitude and
variety of agreements, conventions, protocols, declarations,
acts and regulations, and other multilateral instruments in-
144. Franck, Bricker Amendment in Canada . .. a Rose-Coloured Optical Illusion,
34 NEB. L. REV.• 59 (1954-55).
145. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
146. MacChesney, McDougal, Mathews, Oliver & Ribble, The Treaty Pow~r and
the Constitution: The Case Against Amendment, 40 A.B.A.]. 203 (1954).
147. Id. at 203.
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dicative of the volume of 'international legislation' now in
force between the various countries of the world. Existing
'law-making' treaties deal, among other things, with hours
of work, sanitation, slavery and white slavery, munitions,
monetary arrangements, obscene publications, postal, tele-
graph and telephone communications, copyrights trade marks
and patents, piracy, maritime law and navigation, subma-
rine cables, customs and tariffs, the drug traffic.
"Probably the most important source of future 'inter-
national legislation' will be the various international agencies
established in recent years to achieve peace indirectly by
solving economic, social and cutural problems which have
been the cause of so much unrest and discontent. Already
great strides have been taken· by these agencies in health,
labor, education, and other fields ...
"This brief outline of the scope of 'international legis-
lation' and its major sources is meant to accentuate the im-
portance of the national treaty process in the furtherance
and acceptance of international principles and activities."148
Factors Limiting the Effectiveness oj Interruzl Application oj In-
clusive Policies
From review of the principles and procedures established by
states for facilitating the internal application of inclusive policies, we
turn next to consideration of certain factors which may have a pecu-
liarly limiting effect upon the internal application of international
law, whether customary or projected by agreement. Such factors
include, as indicated, constitutional provisions for allocation of com-
petence among different internal decision-makers, idiosyncratic vaga-
ries in interpretation, and avoidance of responsibility by invocation of
a concept of "political questions."
Beginning with the constitutional provisions, it may be noted
that national constitutions not infrequently require that certain in-
ternal decision-makers such as judges, give effect to internal prescrip-
tions, constitutional or statutory, even though the body politic as a
whole is committed otherwise in external arenas by inclusive policies.
This dictate is made explicit, with respect to internal constitutional
provisions, in Article 189 of the 1946 Constitution of Ecuador, which
reads:
"The Constitution is the supreme law of the republic.
Therefore, any ... public pacts or treaties which are in any
way contradictory to it or which depart from its text have
no validity."
148. HENDRY, TREATIES AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS 2-3 (1955). The reference
to Hudson is to his eight volumes of INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION (1929-49).
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The same result is not explicitly demanded by the United States Con-
stitution but there is a high consensus among scholars that the Su-
preme Court should not, and probably would not, give internal effect
to an agreement in contravention of constitutional provisions. Thus,
in dictum, the Supreme Court has indicated that "It would not be
contended that (the treaty power) extends so far as to authorize
what the Constitution forbids."149 From this dictum and others, the
common opinion is that the Fifth Amendment limits, as Professor
Corwin puts it, "not merely ... congressional power, but the treaty-
power as well, whenever it infringes upon private rights.1l150 The other
Bill of Rights provisions may be assumed similarly to limit the internal
application of an international agreement otherwise validly con-
cluded.m
Under constitutional doctrines of legislative supremacy, courts
may even be required to give effect to ordinary internal statutes when
in contravention of acknowledged inclusive policies. For illustration
from Great Britain, reference may be made to the well-known case of
Mortensen v. Peters.152 In this case, Scotch officials acting under al-
leged authority of a Scotch statute seized Danish fishermen in inter-
national waters. When it was urged upon the High Court of the
Judiciary of Scotland, that internal statute could not in violation of
international law authorize the seizure of foreign nationals beyond the
limits of the territorial sea, the Court responded:
"In this Court we have nothing to do with the question
of whether the Legislature has or has not done what foreign
powers may consider a usurpation in a question with them.
Neither are we a tribunal sitting to decide whether an Act
of the Legislature is ultra vires as in contravention of gen-
erally acknowledged principles of international law. For us
an Act of Parliament duly passed by Lords and Commons
and assented to by the King, is supreme, and we are bound
to give effect to its terms."153
Within the United States it is almost immemorial precedent in the
Supreme Court that as between conflicting international agreements
and Congressional statutes, internal effectiveness will be given to that
expression of authority which is latest in time. Thus, in Whitney v.
149. Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890).
ISO. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WORLD ORGANIZATION 17 (1944).
151. McDougal & Leighton, The Rights of Man in the World Community: Con-
stitutional Illusions versus Rational Action, 59 YALE L.J. 60, 104 (1949).
Note the very broad statement by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in the opinion of the
Court, in Perez v. Brownell, 78 S. Ct. 568, 576 (1958).
152. 14 Scots L.T.R. 227 (1906); BRIGGS, op. cit. supra note 11, at 52.
153. BRIGGS, op. cit. supra note 11, at 54.
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Robertson, holding that a most favored nation clause was superseded
by Congressional legislation, the Court stated:
"By the Constitution a Treaty is placed on the same
footing, and made of like obligation, with an Act of legisla-
tion. Both are declared by that instrument to be the su-
preme law of the land, and no superior efficacy is given to
either over the other. When the two relate to the same sub-
ject, the courts will always endeavor to construe them so as
to give effect to both, if that can be done without violating
the language of either; but if the two are inconsistent, the
one last in date will control the other, provided always the
stipulation of the Treaty on the subject is self-executing.
If the country with which the Treaty is made is dissatisfied
with the action of the legislative department, it may present
its complaint to the executive head of the government, and
take such other measures as it may deem essential for the
protection of its in.terests. The courts can afford no re-
dress."l54
Limitation of the internal effectiveness of inclusive policy by
idiosyncratic interpretation is unfortunately all too common. In dis-
cussing the Interhandel case we have already made reference to how
the United States seeks to preserve its freedom of decision by insisting
upon an interpretation of an arbitration agreement that would reserve
to itself the exclusive competence to determine whether a matter is
within its domestic jurisdiction.155 Similarly, in Mortensen v. Peters,
mentioned above, the Scotch Court, not content to rest its opinion
upon simple legislative supremacy, maintained that the statute in
question was not inconsistent with international law, a position the
British executive department subsequently repudiated. Latin America,
for further example, beset by controversies about its treatment of
aliens, contends in relative uniqueness that an individual may by
agreement forego the protection of his government-the so-called
Calvo Doctrinel56-and that equality of treatment of nationals and
foreigners precludes international delinquency, while much of the rest
of the world. insists upon an inalienable standard of civilized society
for foreigners, however nationals may be treated.157 Still similarly,
when arguments made on behalf of Soviet trading corporations both
in tribunals in the USSR and abroad are taken together, the Soviet
Government exhibits itself in the following inconsistency: When dam-
ages are sought from the Soviet trading corporation, or when a Soviet
154. 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888).
155. See notes 84-89 supra and accompanying text.
156. See BRIGGS, op. cit. supra note 11, at 637-39.
157. United States (Roberts Claim) v. Mexico (1926), id. at 549.
HeinOnline -- 4 S.D. L. Rev. 83 1959
1959] IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON NATIONAL LAW 83
government department has done something (regulation, withholding
of license, etc.) on which the corporation relies as an excuse for non-
performance, the effort is made to dissociate the trading corporation
from the Soviet government, either in order to deny the financial
responsibility of the government or in order to invoke the defense of
force majeure. On the other hand, when the Soviet trading corpora-
tion, pleading in foreign courts, desires that the court apply Soviet law
to questions of the validity of a contract, the corporation contends
that, regardless of other contracts, Soviet law must be applied in order
to avoid infringement of the sovereignty of the Soviet state, of which
the corporation somehow partakes.158 Put most delicately by Professor
Brierly, the general point is that "a national court can apply its own
version of what the rule of international law is, and however ob-
jectively it may try to approach a question which raises an issue of
international law, its views will inevitably be influenced by national
factors. 1l159 In its broadest reach, this is but the principal difficulty
of what Professor Gross calls auto-interpretation.160
For final illustration of limiting factors, we note that judges may
also seek to escape responsibility for the internal application of in-
clusive policies by passing the issue of international commitment to
the executive under the doctrine of political questions-a doctrine
defined by Professor Dickinson as affirming that "courts may neither
reconsider nor review the decision of a coordinate department of the
Government made in the exercise of its constitutional authority.1l161
Impelling predispositions of courts may include an awareness of the
importance of the effects of decision upon foreign policy, a preference
for unified foreign policy over maintenance of checks and balances
between different branches of internal government, recognition of lack
of knowledge and inability to secure knowledge of relevant facts, and
so on. The range of issues which has in the United States, for ex-
ample, been historically passed from courts to executive embrace
again almost all interactions in power processes, such as: the status
of participants in internal arenas--consequences of recognition of
states and governments; extent of territory--either when claimed by
the United States, or when the United States merely disputed the sov-
ereignty of another state; control of people-treatment of aliens,
including expulsion and exclusion; lawfulness of practices--existence
or termination of a state of war, and the validity of agreements in such
158. Pisar, Soviet Conflict of Laws in International Commercial Transactions, 70
HARv. L. REV. 593, 654 (1957).
159. BRIERLY, LAW OF NATIONS 88 (5th ed. 1955).
160. See note 59 supra and accompanying text.
161. Dickinson, The Law of Nations as National Law: "Political Questions," 104
U. PA. L. REV. 451 (1956).
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issues as whether the foreign executive was competent to enter into
an agreement, or whether the validity of the agreement continues
with change in formal authority or violation by the other signatory;
jurisdiction-retroactivity of recognition, rights and immunities of
states-particularly public vessels and diplomatic status-and the
so-called acts of state of another government alleged by it to have
been within its own exclusive competence.162
Mitigation by Interpretation
In modest mitigation of all these limiting factors, it should per-
haps be pointed out that courts will sometimes endeavor to construe
internal legislation so as not to conflict with international law, cus-
tomary or conventional. " [A] n act of Congress ought never to be
construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construc-
tion remains," Chief Justice Marshall once insisted/63 and this same
principle was quite recently reaffirmed in Lauritzen v. Larson/64 which
construed the Jones Act purporting to embrace "all seamen" as in-
applicable to foreign ships. This constructional preference is found
also in other states, as indicated by Professor Morgenstern:
"In order to prevent violations of international law in
this connection courts have strained their powers to the ut-
most in refusing to recognize that a violation of international
law was intended (by legislative organs) unless such inten-
tion was expressed in the most unequivocal terms.m65
It may be recalled further that in the practice of some states-Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Germany, Guatemala, Italy, Panama, Uraguay, and
Switzerland--even a later legislative enactment is construed not to
invalidate the domestic application of treaties/66 an attitude which
found formal recognition in Article 28 of the 1946 French Consti-
tution:
"Since diplomatic treaties duly ratified and published
have authority superior to that of French internal legisla-
tion, their provisions shall not be abrogated, modified, or
suspended without previous formal denunciation through
diplomatic channels.m6T
162. For collection of cases in all categories mentioned above, see, e.g., ibid. at
453-92; POST, THE SUPREME COURT AND POLITICAL QUESTIONS (1936) j FRANK, POLITICAL
QUESTIONS IN SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME LAW (Cabn ed. 1954). .
163. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 65, 118 (1804).
164. 345 U.S. 571 (1953).
165. Morgenstern, Judicial Practice and the Supremacy of International Law,
27 BRlT. YB. INT'L L. 42, 91 (1950).
166. See BRlGGs, op. cit. supra note 11, at 889 j Dihigo, supra note 134, at 749 j
Morgenstern, supra note 165 at 85.
167. The most relevant section of the new Constitution- of 1958, Art. 44, reads:
"Treaties or accords normally ratified or approved have, upon their publi-
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The Appeal from Internal Arenas to External Arenas
The most important factor in promoting internal application of
inclusive policies is, for our final major point, the well recognized
practice among states of honoring appeal from non-application or
misapplication in internal arenas to the processes of authority in ex-
ternal arenas. Even though judges may on occasion be required by
their national constitutions to apply national rather than interna-
tional policies, in cases before them, states that feel aggrieved may
still insist upon performance or substitute performance in external
arenas. Thus, after the judgment of the Court in Mortensen v. Peters,
the British Government remitted the fine and amended the internal
statute to prevent repetition of conflict with inclusive prescriptions.16S
The United States acted similarly in the famous McLeod affair, in
which a member of the British expeditionary force from Canada, the
force which put fire to the insurgent Caroline and set her adrift over
Niagara Falls, was brought to trial in aNew York court for killing
a citizen in national waters. Although Great Britain argued that the
expedition was governmental and authorized by self-defense, and in-
. sisted that the accused was not amenable to suit in the civil courts of
the United States, the federal government did not succeed in stopping
the prosecution in the state court, prior to acquittal. On British in-
sistence that constitutional inability did not excuse the violation of
international law, Congress passed in 1842 an act to authorize removal
to federal courts, and release on habeas corpus, of persons accused of
unlawful acts committed under the authority of a foreign state.169
For more important and continuously recurrent illustration, Professor
Borchard refers to the "innumerable precedents which have held
states liable for their failure to perform international obligations,
whether the delinquency arises out of statute or administrative act,"
and states:
"Whenever a country by municipal statute or decree
authorizes unlawful seizures from or arbitrarily discriminates
against foreigners, under the criterion of international law
and not merely municipal law, it incurs international re-
sponsibility and must repair the wrong in the most prac-
ticable manner possible.1l170
cation, an authority superior to that of laws, under the condition, for each
agreement or treaty, of its application by the other party."
See New York Times, Sept. 5, 1958, p. 10.
168. BRIGGS, op. cit. supra note 11, at 55-57.
169. For the account of the affair, see BEMIS, DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES 259-61 (rev. ed. 1942); Jenning, The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 AM. J.
lNT'L L. 82 (1938).
170. Borchard, The Relation Between International Law and Municipal Law, 27
VA. L. REV. 137, 145-46 (1940).
HeinOnline -- 4 S.D. L. Rev. 86 1959
86 SOUTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4
Indeed, even decisions by the United States Supreme Court sustaining
seizure of foreign vessels either as prize or pursuant to a statute regu-
lating fishing beyond territorial waters, have culminated in payment
of heavy damages by the United States, either voluntarily by the
executive, or pursuant to arbitration. l7l Thus, as stated by Secretary
of State Bayard, in summing up the American practice:
"It has been consistently maintained and also admitted
by the Government of the United States that a government
can not appeal to its municipal regulations as an answer to
demands for the fulfillment of international duties.lll72
In description of comparable British practice, Lord McNair writes:
"We admit that, if by reason of any deficiency in our
legal institutions our Courts fail to give effect to the
rule of international law binding upon us, it is the duty of
the executive part of our Government to make good that
deficiency by making reparation to the injured State. We
admit also that we cannot plead as an excuse for a breach
of international obligations any defect in our own legal
system.>H73
That these opinions represent a general consensus among states is
indicated by Article 13 of the United Nations Declaration of Rights
and Duties of States, quoted above, which stipulates clearly that
states may not invoke in external arenas provisions in their own con-
stitutions and laws as excuse for failure to perform international
obligation.l74
III.
THE COMMON INTEREST IN AN ECONOMIC BALANCE
OF INCLUSIVE AND EXCLUSIVE COMPETENCE
From our inquiry above, it has become apparent that the inter-
relation of international law and national law is most realistically
viewed, not in terms of the relative supremacy, other interrelation,
or reception of rules, but rather in terms of the interpenetration of
multiple processes of authoritative decision of varying territorial
compass. The rules commonly referred to as international law and
national law are but perspectives of authority-Perspectives about
who should decide what, with respect to whom, for the promotion of
what policies, by what methods-which are constantly being created,
terminated, and recreated by established decision-makers located at
171. Id. at 145.
172. U.S. FOR. REL. 753 (1887).
173. McNair, supra note 141, at 12.
174. U.N. Gen. Ass. Res. No. 375 (IV), U.N. Gen. Ass. Off. Rec., 4th Sess., Reso-
lutions, p. 66 (1949).
HeinOnline -- 4 S.D. L. Rev. 87 1959
1959] IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON NATIONAL LAW 87
many different positions in the structures of authority of both states
and international governmental organizations. No elaborate theories
of supremacy, coordination, subordination, adoption, incorporation,
or transformation are needed to account for the impact of processes
of authority external to particular states upon the processes internal
to such states. Each particular state of the world, whatever the fun-
damental goals of its elites, is inescapably enmeshed in an effective
global power process, constituted by patterns both of authority and
of control, which encompasses and affects, and is in turn affected by,
not merely the processes of the various particular states, but also
hemispheric, continental, and oceanic processes, and even, in further
emphasis of the porousness of state boundaries,the processes of the
province, of the city, and of the humble village or township. The
traditional focus upon inherited "rules" takes too little account of
the factors which affect decision in the different power processes, of
the consequences of decision for the different territorial communities
and their component participants, and, hence, of the immense com-
plexity of the continuous interactions by which the different power
processes affect each other in variegated patterns of authority and
control, crossing and recrossing state lines.
The principal point which we have sought to establish in the
brief and impressionistic discussion above is that, in this global
process of authoritative and controlling decision, particular states are
most substantially affected by inclusive policies prescribed in arenas
external to any particular state and applied in consequential con-
formity both in such external arenas and in the internal arenas of
particular states. The major outlines of this impact of inclusive
policies upon the external strategies and internal policies of particular
states have been traced through a number of different patterns of
authority and control, including:
(1) the establishment by decision-makers external to any
particular state, through inclusive policies, of a broad
and flexible, "constitutional" allocation of competence
-reflected in the polar concepts of "international con-
cern" and "domestic jurisdiction," their equivalents,
and a multitude of detailed prescriptions on specific
issues-for inclusive decision by the general community
of states and exclusive decision by particular states;
(2) the exercise, in varying organized and unorganized
structures of authority and through varying policy
functions, by the general community of states of its com-
petence so established for the prescription and applica-
tion of inclusive policies which importantly affect
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particular states in all their power and other value
interactions;
(3) the practice of particular states, through varying con-
stitutional principles and procedures and by varying
officials, of applying within internal arenas and with a
consequential degree of uniformity, the inclusive policies
so prescribed by the general community for the regu-
lation of participants in internal value processes; and
(4) the practice by particular states of honoring appeals
for alleged misapplications of inclusive policies in their
internal arenas to the external arenas of the general
community.
More extended inquiry might have revealed, further, that particular
states in exercise of the exclusive competence, allocated to them by
inclusive constitutional policies, are influenced in high degree in their
exclusive prescription and application of policies, for the regulation
of their internal affairs, by the general limits sought to be imposed
by externally prescribed inclusive policies, constitutional and other-
wise.
This highly consequential impact of processes of authoritative
decision external to particular states upon the internal processes of
such states has of course, from a scientific perspective, been affected
by all the variable and interacting component factors of the global
power process in past world arenas.175 Among the more significant
factors in promoting the effectiveness of inclusive policies have, how-
ever, been the increasing frequency and intensity of contact and
interactions among peoples, mentioned in our preliminary outlining
of the world social process, which has been made possible by modern
invention and technology; the rapid diffusion and unification of mate-
rial culture consequent upon increased interaction; the rising unity
of demand among peoples everywhere for wider participation in the
production and sharing of all values; the increasing interdependences
of all peoples for the attainment of their demanded production and
sharing of values; the increasing recognition by peoples of their inter-
dependence and common interests; and a growing understanding of
the role that law, conceived as authority conjoined with control, can
be made to play in the greater production and sharing of demanded
values. The all-pervasive impact of international law upon national
law in recent decades has thus been, more simply, but a function of
the increasing demands by. peoples everywhere for a world public
order affording both a minimal security, in the sense of freedom from
175. These factors are characterized and described in some detail in McDougal
and Feliciano, supra note 51, and McDougal and Burke, supra note 40.
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violence and threats of violence, and expanding opportunity to pursue
all values by peaceful, non-coercive procedures.
Turning for a moment from consideration of the past to pro-
jection of possible future developments, it is conceivable, though
highly improbable, that the factors which have hitherto promoted the
effectiveness of inclusive policies will lose their energies and give way
to opposing factors and trends favoring exclusivity. Much more prob-
able is the possibility that the factors tending toward inclusive deci-
sion will accelerate in the intensity of their compulsion. Even the
advent of such new weaponry as artificial satellites, intercontinental
ballistic missiles, and nuclear war-heads, though temporarily divisive,
must ultimately accentuate the interdependence of all human beings
even for mere survival. Increasing interdependence with respect to
security, along with such other developments as burgeoning popula-
tions and improvements in the technology of production, transport,
and communication, must inevitably bring increasing interdependence
with respect to all other values, upon which security depends and
which in turn affect security.176 Along with such acceleration on a
global, and perhaps universal, scale of the interdetermination of social
and power processes, one can with confidence expect a concomitant
intensification of demands for the stabilization, guidance, and regu-
lation of such processes by inclusive authority and control.
For peoples genuinely dedicated to a world public order of human
dignity the increasing compulsion of factors tending toward inclusive
authority and control may, paradoxically, pose an especially difficult
problem in the clarification of future policies. The difficulty arises
from the fact that not all the aspiring world public orders exhibited
by the contemporary world arena are equally dedicated, beyond
rhetoric, to the values of human dignity. Among the strongest of these
orders, aspiring to completion on a world scale, are indeed the totali-
tarian, which explicitly glorify the use of force for purposes of ex-
pansion, accepting no limits formulated in terms of conservation or
self-defense, which postulate the monopolization rather than the shar-
ing of many important values, and which preach a spurious universality
or "coexistence" as a short-term tactic in a long-term strategy of
poising adversaries for ultimate destruction.177 Should the tides of
victory in global struggle begin to run in favor of such totalitarian
orders, the temptation may be strong for the adherents of human
dignity to attempt to build new walls of isolation in the hope of fending
176. For development, see LASSWELL, op. cit. supra note 18.
177. Snyder and Bracht, Coexistence and International Law, 7 INT. AND COMPo
L. Q. 54 (1958); Aaron and Reynolds, Peaceful Coexistence and Peaceful Cooperation,
4 POUTICAL STUDIES 281 (October, 1956).
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off the impact of external decision. Any such temptation would appear
in advance, however, to be most misguided. The adherents of human
dignity cannot, any more than their totalitarian opponents, hope
successfully to escape the continuously more ineluctable interdepend-
ences of global power and social processes. The adherents of human
dignity, unlike their totalitarian adversaries, are, furthermore, com-
mitted by their fundamental postulates, as the number, range, and
scope of inclusive decisions inevitably advance, to promotion of the
widest possible participation in the making of such decisions by the
people affected.
The most rational alternative open to peoples who genuinely
project a world public order of human dignity would accordingly
appear to be, not futilely to attempt to repel the advance of more
inclusive decision, but rather to continue to seek that balance be-
tween the inclusive competence of the general community of states
and the exclusive competence of particular states most economically
designed to further their long-term basic goal values. Such a balance
must, as we have seen, represent a moving line of compromise, varying
with problems and contexts, between certain complementary, contra-
posed policies: all free peoples have a common interest in the establish-
ment and maintenance of an inclusive competence adequate to secure
common values178 and designed both to protect democratic access by
peoples to participation in decisions which affect them and to achieve
an assumption of responsibility adequate to insure application of
inclusive policies in arenas both external and internal to particular
states; but such peoples have equally a common interest in the estab-
lishment and maintenance of an exclusive competence adequate to
protect particular peoples from arbitrary external interference and
oppression and to promote the greatest possible freedom for initiative,
experiment, and diversity in the effective adaptation of policies to local
contexts. The establishment and maintenance of interacting com-
petences, operating in such delicate balance, depend quite obviously
and fundamentally upon the quality of the processes, structures and
functions, of authoritative decision made available by peoples. Hence,
all free peoples, it may be concluded, continue to have the greatest
common interest in improving such processes, structures and functions,
including especially:
(1) techniques for securing more democratic and more ef-
fective inclusive prescription of policies for activities
with predominantly inclusive effects;
178. That is, adequate to secure the prescription and application of policies which
do in fact incorporate the values of human dignity in the relations projected and
established between peoples and individuals.
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(2) techniques for securing the more effective application of
such inclusively prescribed policies in specific instances
in arenas external to particular states;
(3) techniques for securing the more effective exclusive ap-
plication of inclusively prescribed policies in specific
instances in the internal arenas of particular states; and,
finally,
(4) techniques for securing the more rational exclusive
prescription and application within the internal proc-
esses of states of exclusive policies, both compatible
with inclusively prescribed policies and expressing an
appropriate local initiative, diversity, and experiment.
For some three hundred years of course, reflecting the humani-
tarian perspectives of Western Europe of this period, both interna-
tional and national processes of authoritative decision have exhibited
a slow but consistent trend toward the rationalization and improve-
ment of techniques, structures and functions, for the purposes above
indicated, and books upon international law today abound with sug-
gestions for still further improvement. The most persuasive recom-
mendations for the next, immediate steps in improvement may involve
little more than further testing and extension of past insights and
inventions. For improvement of the prescribing and applying func-
tions in arenas external to particular states, there are, for example, a
great range of plausible proposals for extending the intelligence and
recommending functions of the United Nations and specialized agen-
cies and for expanding the compulsory jurisdiction of international
tribunals. For improving the exclusive application of inclusive policies
in internal arenas, consideration might be given to a variety of pro-
posals, such as: full acceptance of an inclusive prescription that states
may not successfully invoke their own constitutional inadequacies,
whether relating to the making or performance of agreements, as a
defense to international obligation reasonably expected by others; the
amendment of national constitutions to eliminate undemocratic, minor-
ity vetoes, whether by special minorities in central legislatures or by
provincial groups in federal states, upon a states' comprehensive for-
eign affairs powers; 119 and, finally, ratification of a multi-lateral treaty
incorporating, as apparently suggested by Judge Lauterpacht/80 the
substance of Article VIC 2) of the United States Constitution, thus
committing states not to change constitutional provisions requiring the
internal application of international law. For increasing the efficacy
179. An excellent recent statement of the need may be found in HENDRY, op. cit.
supra note 148.
180. Survey of International Law, Memorandum submitted by the Secretary-
General, United Nations-General Assembly, International Law Commission (1948) 23.
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of appeal from internal arenas to external arenas because of alleged
misapplication of inclusive prescription, consideration might be given
both to the creation of new tribunals or hierarchies of tribunals and
to authorizing access to such tribunals by new participants, such as
private individuals and associations. The ran'ge in type and detail of
possible improvements in structure and function, at many different
community levels, obviously approximate the infinite.
In inventing, evaluating, and choosing between possible alter-
natives for improvement, proponents of a world public order of human
dignity might, for one final emphasis of a policy oriented perspective,
well bear in mind the rational primacy of fundamental goal values
over institutional modalities. There are many different kinds of world
public order-involving many different interrelations of international
and national law or of inclusive and exclusive decision-which might
in the foreseeable future effectively serve the causes of human dignity,
and no particular institutional modalities in authority structures and
functions are uniquely indispensable. Scholars who make neat dichot-
omous distinctions between "world law" and "anarchy," or "world
government" and "international organization," or "international or-
ganization" and "international law," or "universalism" and "region-
alism," and so on,181 and project these imaginary polar entities upon
a troubled world, with insistent demands that mankind must choose
between them, make but little contribution to rational action toward
their proclaimed goals. The interrelations between the different proc-
esses of authoritative decision exhibited by the world' arena must
always be as protean as the multiple variables which in fact affect
decision in the various processes. For genuine proponents of human
dignity who would be effective, there can be no substitute-meta-
physical absolute or procedural gimmick-for either continuous clari-
fication of fundamental goal values in terms of the particular problems
in particular contexts, or unremitting effort, by all instruments of
policy, to create in effective decision-makers the world over the pre-
dispositions (demands, identification, and expectations) necessary to
secure acceptance of such modalities and, hence, to move their pro-
jected world public order of human dignity further toward realization
in fact.
181. Including, it may be added, factitious distinctions between "political factors"
and "legal factors."
